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  Abstract:  The Japanese "main bank system" figures prominently in the recent 
literature on "relationship banking."  By most accounts, the main bank epitomizes 
relationship finance:  traditionally, every large Japanese firm had one, and that bank 
monitored the firm, participated in its governance, acted as the delegated monitor for 
other creditors, and rescued the firm if it fell into financial distress.  Yet all this has begun 
to change, continue these accounts.  Japan deregulated its financial markets in the 1980s, 
and many firms abandoned their relational lender for market finance.  As the main banks 
then lost their ability to the constrain firms -- as relationship banking unraveled -- the 
firms gambled in the stock and real estate bubbles, the bubbles burst, and the firms threw 
the country into recession. 
  Using financial and governance data from 1980 through  1994, we show that 
none of this is true.  The accounts of the Japanese main bank instead represent fables, 
stories we collectively recite because they so conveniently illustrate the theories and 
models we hope to develop.  Whether during the 1980s boom or the 1990s recession, 
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  Banks mitigate adverse selection by screening applicants for loans.  They mitigate 
moral hazard by monitoring borrowers.  Investors could do all that themselves, but 
because of scale economies delegate the screening and monitoring to banks. 
  Loans not only require screening and monitoring, but introduce problems of time-
inconsistency.  That to which a borrower would like to commit ex ante may involve 
strategies from which it would prefer to defect ex post.  That to which a bank would like 
to commit may present parallel dilemmas.  To mitigate these time-inconsistency 
problems, banks sometimes loan through long-term relationships. 
  In focusing on the resulting relational nature to business lending, scholars have 
developed a plethora of models and undertaken a variety of empirical projects.  Yet to 
motivate their work, they often return to accounts of "the Japanese main bank."  Every 
large Japanese firm has a long-term relationship with a leading bank, they recite.  That 
bank -- called its "main bank" -- monitors the firm.  It participates closely in its 
governance.  Not only does it monitor for itself, it monitors on behalf of other creditors.  
It promises to rescue the firm should it fall into financial distress.  And just as it 
contributed so much to Japan's post-war growth in its heyday, it unwittingly exacerbated 
the current malaise when de-regulation cut into its ability to monitor and control firms.  
  In short, in these stylized accounts Japanese main banks epitomize "relationship 
banking."  Yet if the accounts seem too good to be true, they are.  Like the oft-repeated 
tales of the GM-Fisher-Body merger or the QWERTY keyboard layout, the accounts of 
Japanese main banks are "fables."  They are stories we collectively tell and retell because 
we so badly wish they were true -- because they so neatly fit the theory we want to 
develop.  Unfortunately, they have nothing to do with either the finance or the 
governance of the Japanese firm. 
  We begin by outlining modern banking and relationship banking theory (Section 
I.A.-B.).  We summarize the main bank system as described in the literature and locate its 
rhetorical role within relationship-banking theory (Section I.C.-D.).  We introduce our 
1980-94 data on the financial and governance arrangements at the 1000-odd largest 
Japanese firms (Section II.).  Using this data, we then ask how well it supports the 
conventional hypotheses about the main bank system, either during the booming 1980s or 
the depressed 1990s (Section III.). 
 
I.  Banking and the Economics of Information 
A.  Informational Asymmetries and the Theory of Banks: 
  The economics of information figures prominently in modern banking theory.   
Indeed, until "the foundations of the economics of information were laid," proclaim 
Freixas & Rochet, the "microeconomic theory of banks could not exist" (1997: 8).
1  Enter 
the new theory, however, and the bank's role becomes clear:  it "screen[s] the different 
demands for loans" to prevent adverse selection, and "monitor[s] the projects" to forestall 
moral hazard. 
  To screen and monitor, a lender will need to expend resources.  Some of the 
resources it will invest in general information-gathering technology.  Because of the scale 
                     
1 To similar effect:  e.g., Hubbard, et al. (2002: 560); Stiglitz (2001: 513); Leland & Pyle (1977: 372). Relationship Banking in Japan:  Page 3 
economies to these investments, small lenders will tend to lend through intermediaries.  
Those intermediaries will then serve as their "delegated monitors" (Diamond, 1984).   
Hence banks:  in depositing their money with banks, lenders delegate to the bank the task 
of screening and monitoring the firms that borrow.   
  Other resources a lender will invest in information specific to the borrower.  Yet 
if general investments push lenders to work through intermediaries that lend to a variety 
of firms, specific investments push those intermediaries to lend through long-term 
relationships.  The specific investments do so because of the time inconsistency problems 
involved (Mayer, 1988; Freixas & Rochet, 1997: 7).  A bank may want to commit itself 
to a risky loan in order to encourage a firm to invest in a good project, for example -- but 
fear that the firm will switch lenders once the project succeeds; a borrower may want to 
invest in a project long-term -- but fear that the bank will exploit its vulnerability at the 
time of renewal; the bank may want to commit itself not to exploit such a borrower -- but 
fear that a long debt term would encourage moral hazard, and so forth.  By lending in the 
context of long-term relations, banks and firms mitigate the effect of the time-
inconsistency inherent in lending.  
 
B.  The Theory of Banks and Relationship Banking: 
  By the 1990s, scholars working on these time-inconsistency problems had created 
the new sub-field of "relationship banking."  Although to date they have avoided a 
common definition (but see Boot, 2000: 10), most writers in the field use the concept to 
capture the polar case of a firm that works closely with a bank year after year.  Each bank 
maintains ongoing relationships with a variety of debtors in these models, but each debtor 
borrows primarily from its relational bank.   
  This reliance by the firm on its relational bank generates several intriguing results.  
First, it gives the bank ex post "bargaining  power" over the borrower (Rajan, 1992).  As 
Rajan & Zingales (1998: 41) put it, the relational bank tries "to secure her return on 
investment by retaining some kind of monopoly power over the firm she finances."   
  Second, the relational bank may agree implicitly to rescue the firm if it falls into 
financial distress.  It uses its “monopoly power to charge above-market rates in normal 
circumstances," explain Rajan & Zingales (1998: 42; see Petersen & Rajan, 1995).  In 
return, it offers "an implicit agreement to provide below-market financing when [its] 
borrowers get into trouble."   
  Third, the bank's long-term "monopoly" fogs the firm's price signals.  The 
“relationship-banking proximity” can create a “potential lack of toughness on the banks’ 
part in enforcing credit contracts,” writes Boot (2000: 16).  Necessarily, this flexibility ex 
post generates a “soft-budget constraint” ex ante.   
 
C.  Relationship Banking and Japanese Main Banks: 
  1.  The main bank as fable. -- Much like the GM-Fisher-Body merger in the 
theory of the firm, the QWERTY keyboard in network-externalities theory or the keiretsu 
corporate groups in Japanese industrial organization (Spulber, 2002; Miwa & Ramseyer, 
2002b), tales of Japanese banking figure prominently in relationship banking studies.   
And prominently they sport a "main bank."  They assert (as we detail in Subsections 2 
and 3 below) that most Japanese firms maintain a long-term relationship with such a main 
bank; that these main banks closely monitor their debtors; that they monitor as well for Relationship Banking in Japan:  Page 4 
the other banks; that they rescue defaulting debtors; and that their recent decline explains 
Japan's current economic malaise. 
  All this makes the Japanese main bank, in Patrick's (1994: 359) words, nothing 
less than "the epitome of relationship banking."  Scholars like Mayer (1988) and Rajan 
(1992) use the Japanese example to motivate their classic accounts of relational banking 
theory, and well they might -- for the stylized main bank fits the theory to a tee.  As "a 
long-term relationship between a firm and a particular bank from which the firm obtains 
its largest share of borrowings," contend Aoki and his co-authors, the Japanese main bank 
system captures the essence of "relational contracting between banks and firms."
2  
  Over the past couple of decades, scholars have used the concept of the main bank 
to illustrate a wide variety of issues in relational banking theory.  Exploring collective 
action problems among creditors, Hoshi, Kashyap & Scharfstein (1990, 1991) claim main 
banks lower the cost of financial distress.  Focusing more broadly on informational issues, 
Miyajima (1998: 43) states that they "facilitated corporate investment by mitigating 
information problems."  Addressing the monopoly power of a relational bank, Weinstein 
& Yafeh (1998) and McGuire (2002) argue that main banks extract rents from their 
debtors.  And studying the indeterminacy of price signals in a relational environment, 
Rajan & Zingales (1998) blame main bank finance for the current Japanese depression. 
  
  2.  The contours of the main bank relationship. -- (a) Introduction.  Exactly what a 
main bank relationship entails is harder to know -- and for good reason:  no one has seen 
a main bank contract.  Even by the most committed of main-bank scholars, banks and 
firms make these arrangements "implicitly."  Yet that they negotiated the arrangements 
implicitly, of course, is to say they did not negotiate them at all.  Instead, they left them to 
mutually unstated assumptions.   
  The point is crucial.  Scholars do not claim banks negotiated a contract but left it 
incompletely specified.  Such contracts are still "explicit," and Japanese courts regularly 
enforce vague documents.  They do not claim banks  negotiated a contract but left it 
unwritten.  Oral contracts are "explicit" as well, and Japanese courts regularly enforce 
them too.   
  This absence of any contract among the parties makes hypotheses about the main 
bank system tantalizingly hard to test.  Nonetheless, subject to variety of qualifications, 
most writers posit the following core propositions.   
 
  (b) All big firms have one.  First, most large firms have a main bank.  As Flath 
(2000: 259) put it, "[a]lmost every large corporation in Japan maintains a special 
relationship with some particular bank, the company's 'main bank.'"  Scholars may 
dispute how many small firms have a main bank, but virtually none contests the claim 
that most large firms have one.
3 
 
  (c) The main bank lends and gathers information. Second, the main bank serves as 
a firm's principal lender and a major shareholder, and through those ties acquires 
                     
2 Aoki, Patrick & Sheard (1994: 3) and Aoki & Dinc (2000: 19); see Peek & Rosengren (2003: 3). 
3 Compare Patrick (1994: 387) (main bank system "was essentially only for large industrial firms") with Aoki, 
Patrick & Sheard (1994: 5) ("Almost every Japanese company has what it calls a main bank relationship"). Relationship Banking in Japan:  Page 5 
information.  In the process, it becomes the "central repository of information on the 
borrower" (Milhaupt, 2001: 2087).  The "close information-sharing relationship that 
exists between the bank and the firm," claims Sheard (1989: 403), constitutes the 
"cornerstone" of the system.   
 
  (d) It monitors and intervenes in corporate governance. Third, using that 
information, the main bank monitors and helps govern the firm.  "The main bank system 
is central to the way in which corporate oversight," explain Aoki, Patrick & Sheard 
(1994: 4), "is exercised in the Japanese capital market."  Indeed, writes Flath (2000: 
288), ”main banks could be counted upon to closely monitor the investment choices of 
their client firms."   
Armed with information, the main bank then intervenes in firm governance.   
Declares Sheard (1994: 210), the "central role" of the main bank in "corporate 
governance of large firms is beyond dispute."  Typically, it acquires that role through 
posts on the board.  In Aoki, Patrick & Sheard's (1994: 15) words, the "main bank often 
has its managers sit as directors or auditors on the board of client firms."
4   
 
  (e) It monitors on behalf of all debtors.  Fourth, the main bank does not just 
monitor for itself; it monitors for all creditors.  Restated, the other banks delegate to it the 
task of monitoring the debtor and skirt the duplicative monitoring that would otherwise 
ensue (Hoshi, 1998: 861; see Peek & Rosengren, 2003: 3; Aoki, 2001: 16).  Because each 
money-center bank serves as main bank to a group of firms it monitors, no one bank 
incurs excessive monitoring costs.  Because “reputational concerns” cause each to stay 
informed about those firms, through the reciprocally delegated monitoring the main bank 
system effectively "subjects firms to investor control” (Rajan, 1996: 1364). 
 
 (f)  It  rescues.  Fifth, the main bank intervenes in the affairs of financially 
constrained firms and rescues them.  By Hoshi & Kashyap's (2001: 5) account, it "step[s] 
up and organize[s] a workout" when "firms [run] into financial difficulty."  It launches 
"rescue operations [that] prevent the premature liquidation of temporarily depressed, but 
potentially productive, firms," contends Aoki.
5  Like an idealized textbook bankruptcy 
regime, it first distinguishes financial constraints from economic malaise.  It then rescues 
and restructures those firms that are economically healthy but financially constrained.  
Quite what the “rescue” entails (much less how one should operationalize it empirically), 
however, is an issue on which most observers seem not to agree. 
 
  3.  The main bank and the current malaise. -- All this makes for a theoretically 
intriguing story but an equally elusive empirical quarry:  no bank, firm, or scholar has 
ever seen a "main bank" contract, and no one has advanced a definition many other 
observers want to use.  Fortunately for the empiricist, however, the 1990s depression 
introduces a more clearly testable hypothesis.  According to main bank theorists, the 
firms that flirted with insolvency in the 1990s were those that had expanded most 
                     
4 To similar effect:  e.g., Flath (2000: 259, 279); Sheard (1996: 181); Kester (1993: 70). 
5 (2001: 86).  To similar effect:  e.g., Milhaupt (2001: 2086-88); Sheard (1989: 407); Gilson (1998: 210-11); 
Morck & Nakamura (1999a, 1999b). Relationship Banking in Japan:  Page 6 
aggressively in the late-1980s.  They had expanded during the late-1980s because the 
earlier financial deregulation had cut them loose from their main bank.  Freed from the 
monitoring that had held them in check, they gambled badly in the late-1980s and 
suffered in the 1990s. 
  The deregulation matters because of its effect on competition, and the competition 
because of its effect on relational stability.  According to many relationship-banking 
scholars, firms and banks can more effectively maintain stable long-term relationships 
when financial markets are less competitive.  The "only way to promote relationships," 
suggest Petersen & Rajan (1995: 442), may be "by restricting credit-market competition."  
"Since the theoretic models rely on future rents or quasi-rents to maintain incentive 
compatibility," explain Gorton & Winton (2003: 33), "competition should ... undermine 
relationships."
6   
  According to the conventional wisdom, the Japanese government promoted 
relationship banking by restricting financial competition (but see Miwa & Ramseyer, 
2003b).  Under the post-war regime, reasons Rajan (1996: 1364), the "restrictions on 
bond market financing forced firms to stay in long-term relationships” with banks.  In 
turn, the resulting stability gave those “banks both the incentive to subsidize them in 
times of distress and the ability to recoup the subsidy in the long run."   
  When the government loosened those bond-market restrictions in 1980s, firms 
that could tap market finance did so and jettisoned their main banks.  Alas, given the way 
investors for decades had relied on the main bank for monitoring, Japan lacked the 
monitoring mechanisms in place in other advanced economies.  Effectively, the earlier 
main bank system had "obviat[ed] a need" for "more arm's length market-oriented" 
governance mechanisms to develop.
7  Because they could count on the main bank to 
monitor, writes Flath (2000: 288), shareholders had been able to “disengage from these 
activities with little fear of adverse consequences."   
  Once firms found that their main banks could no longer police them, main bank 
scholars continue, they gambled.  Formerly well-run firms played the real-estate and 
stock markets, and fed speculative bubbles.  When prices collapsed at the end of the 
decade, they found themselves without recourse.   
  The tale appears in a wide array of accounts, but Aoki articulates it as well as 
any.
8  The new bond markets in the 1980s, he reasons, cut the ties between firms and 
banks.  As those ties loosened, the firms became "freed from the bank's implicit and 
explicit intervention."  This, in turn, "diminish[ed] the flow of information from firms to 
city banks and consequently the bank's ability to keep track of the firm's business" (Aoki, 
1994: 137).  In the process, the deregulation triggered "a negative incentive effect on the 
insiders of the firm, as they became free from any external discipline" (Aoki, 2001: 91; 
accord, Aoki, 1994: 137). 
  Once their best clients had abandoned them for bonds, the banks courted firms 
they had earlier spurned.  With newfound access to cash, mediocre firms now found they 
                     
6 Compare Rajan & Zingales (1998) and Yafeh & Yosha (2001), with Boot & Thakor (2000); Boot (2000). 
7 Aoki, Patrick & Sheard (1994: 5).  See Miwa & Ramseyer (2002a, 2003c) for evidence to the contrary. 
8 (2001: 91).  To similar effect:  e.g., Gao (2001: 184); Gilson (1998: 216-17); Kester (1992: 39); Miyajima 
(1998).  Rajan & Zingales (1998) apply the logic to East Asia more generally, and Kaminsky & Reinhart (1999) and 
Hellman, Murdock & Stiglitz (2000) use a similar logic to argue that financial liberalization explains the incidence of 
financial crises. Relationship Banking in Japan:  Page 7 
could play the bubble too (e.g., Dinc & McGuire, 2002: 7).  As deregulation let "key 
bank clients ... sharply reduc[e] their dependence on bank financing,” contend Hoshi & 
Kashyap (1999: 4), banks turned to new clients.  Unfortunately, those "new lines of 
business ... turned out badly." (id., at 4; see Gao, 2001: 186).  Prices fell in the early 
1990s, and these firms now failed as well.   
 
D.  Puzzles: 
  1.  The explanatory puzzle. -- We do not quarrel with the notion that banks 
economize on screening and monitoring costs, any more than we quarrel with Coase's 
point that firms economize on the costs of using the market.  As Alchian & Demsetz 
(1972: 783) said about the latter, "it is a difficult proposition to disagree with or refute."  
Crucially, however, Alchian & Demsetz then pointed out that if the market is not free, 
neither is the firm -- and people have access to many ways of organizing their productive 
activities.  To advance the empirical enterprise, we need to know the relative costs of the 
market, the firm, and these various alternatives.   
  So too with the economics of information and banking theory.  Many banks do 
economize on screening and monitoring expenses over the market, but they introduce 
their own costs in the process.  What is more, investors already face a wide variety of 
ways to screen and monitor.  They face not just decentralized securities markets, but 
mutual funds, insurance companies, leasing firms, and a host of others besides.  Given 
these alternatives, the possibility remains that banking -- as Merton Miller (1998: 8) put it 
-- "is not only basically 19th-century technology, but ... disaster-prone technology" that 
survives only as a regulatory artifact.  At root, information economics does not give us a 
theory of banks.  It gives us a theory of financial intermediaries more generally, and does 
little to distinguish those other intermediaries from the banks. 
 
  2.  The puzzling applicability to Japan. -- By its own terms, moreover, 
relationship-banking theory applies only haphazardly to the Japanese main bank accounts 
anyway.  As a theory, the relationship-banking logic applies only to the least competitive 
financial markets, and within those markets only to the smaller firms.  Thus, to date 
scholars have located the greatest evidence of relationship banking in those sectors most 
insulated from financial market competition.  Peterson & Rajan (1995), for example, find 
relationship banking most pronounced in the most concentrated banking markets.   
Fundamentally (for reasons outlined in Subsections B. & C.3. above), the logic behind 
relationship banking theory simply does not apply to competitive modern capital markets. 
  Yet the large Japanese firms have been raising funds on precisely such 
competitive markets for decades.  Although most firms found the bond market 
inaccessible, large firms could readily raise money through a wide variety of other 
channels.  Most obviously, they could tap the stock market -- which never faced the 
restrictions found for bonds.  Alternatively, they could turn to over 100 banks and 
insurance companies for loans, and regularly borrowed large sums as trade credit from 
their business partners.  Although the government purported to ration credit, in substance 
it never did.  Instead, the lending market cleared at competitive prices.
9   
                     
9 See Miwa & Ramseyer (2003b) for details.  The "deregulation" to which observers refer involved primarily 
the liberalization of the bond market and the elimination of the restrictions on deposit interest rates.  The bank loan Relationship Banking in Japan:  Page 8 
  What is more, relationship banking theorists never claimed that the logic applied 
to large firms, and empiricists working on non-Japanese examples seldom find it there.  
In Petersen & Rajan's (1995) early formulation, again, relationship banking in the U.S. 
characterizes only small-firm finance.  Bernanke (1983) uses an earlier variant of the 
theory to explore the impact of bank failures on small firms in the 1930s.  Degryse & Van 
Cayseele (2000) apply it to small firms in Europe, while Berger & Udell (1995) and 
Blackwell & Winters (1997) again apply it to small firms in the U.S. 
  These limits to the logic seem to have been lost on those who would apply it to 
Japan.  There, scholars focus on the very biggest exchange-listed firms.  They do not 
argue that most Japanese firms have a main bank.  Instead, they argue that most large 
firms have a main bank.  Of the many small firms in Japan, most observers instead claim 
that “few if any have main banks" (Flath, 2000: 283). 
  As the summary above should make clear, however, relationship banking theory 
does not fit large listed firms.  Much of the analytical apparatus hinges on the “monopoly 
power” a relational bank acquires over a firm through the information it collects.   
"Without market power,” reason Yafeh & Yosha (2001: 66), “banks would not be able to 
extract rents generated by investment in ties with firms, and consequently there would be 
little or no relationship banking."  Without that market power, in short, most relationship-
banking models simply unravel.   
  This “monopoly” or “market” power that a bank would acquire over a firm is a 
power it could plausibly acquire only over relatively small firms in relatively 
uncompetitive financial markets.  Over firms that can readily borrow only from one or 
two regional banks, perhaps a relational bank (whether in Japan or anywhere else) could 
acquire that power in time.  It will not acquire the power over the large.  Exchange-listed 
Japanese firms typically borrow only 15-35 percent of their debt from their lead bank, 
and spread the rest over many others.  Necessarily, if a firm raises equity capital on a 
national exchange and borrows from many banks besides, no bank will have “monopoly 
power” over its finance. 
 
II.  Testing the Tale 
A.  Testable Implications: 
  Consider, now, whether the Japanese main bank story fits the data.  Because we 
define a firm's main bank as the bank that lends the firm the largest share of its debt, we 
do not test the proposition that all firms have a main bank.
10  Because observers attribute 
the phenomenon only to the largest firms, we table our misgivings above and direct our 
inquiry to the larger exchange-listed firms.  We then extract the following testable 
implications from the main bank literature: 
 
                                                             
market had been highly competitive for decades (id.).  Even before this "deregulation," large firms had diversified their 
loans among many banks (Miwa & Ramseyer, 2002b). 
10 More  precisely,  for  Past Main-Bankers, Concurrent Main-Bankers,  MB Loan Fraction, and MB 
Change, a firm’s main bank is the institution with the greatest amount of loans outstanding at the firm.  Inter alia, this 
approach tracks Campbell & Hamao (1994), Kang & Stulz (2000), and Morck, Nakamura & Shivdasani (2000).   
Weinstein & Yafeh (1998), Horiuchi, Packer & Fukuda (1988), Morck & Nakamura (1999), and McGuire (2003) 
instead use one of the several keiretsu rosters as a proxy for main-bank affiliation.  For reasons we detail in Miwa & 
Ramseyer (2002b), however, these rosters capture nothing of economic significance and only loosely track each other 
anyway. Relationship Banking in Japan:  Page 9 
  1.  Monitoring by main banks. If banks regularly monitor their debtors and 
participate in corporate governance through board appointments, then most firms should 
include several representatives from their main bank on the board; if banks focus on their 
more troubled clients, then declines in firm performance should lead to increases in the 
number of main bank representatives on a board.   
 
  2.  Delegation of monitoring.  If a firm's secondary lenders delegate their 
monitoring to the firm’s main bank, then banker-directors overwhelmingly should be 
affiliated with the main bank rather than other banks. 
 
  3.  Rescues by main banks. If a main bank implicitly agrees to rescue troubled 
firms, then a decline in performance should lead to (i) a decrease in a firm’s inclination to 
change its main bank affiliation, and (ii) an increase in the fraction of a firm's debt 
borrowed from the main bank.   
 
  4.  Deregulation and the depression. If deregulation-induced disintermediation 
caused economic decline by reducing bank monitoring, then (i) those firms that most 
sharply reduced their dependence on bank debt should have grown most rapidly in the 
booming late 1980s, and (ii) those firms that grew most rapidly should then have earned 
the lowest profits in the depressed 1990s. 
 
B.  The Data: 
For this project, we examine all non-bank firms listed on Section 1 of the Tokyo 
Stock Exchange (TSE).  These are the largest of the listed firms.  We collect financial 
data from 1980 to 1994, and board composition data in 1980, 1985, 1990, and 1995.  We 
take our basic financial data from the Nikkei NEEDS and QUICK data bases.  From the 
Kabushiki toshi shueki ritsu, we then add shareholder returns, and from the Kigyo 
keiretsu soran gather information on board composition.
11 
 
C.  The Variables: 
  With this data, we construct the following variables.  We include selected 
summary statistics in Table 1. 
  [Insert Table 1 about here.] 
 
  1.  Board composition variables.
12 -- As of 1980, 1985, 1990, and 1995:
13 
  Past Bankers:  The number of directors on the board with a past career at a bank. 
                     
11 Nikkei QUICK joho, K.K., NEEDS (Tokyo, Nikkei QUICK joho, as updated); Nikkei QUICK joho, K.K., 
QUICK (Tokyo, Nikkei QUICK joho, as updated); Nihon shoken keizai kenkyu jo, ed., Kabushiki toshi shueki ritsu 
[Rates of Return on Common Stocks] (Tokyo:  Nihon shoken keizai kenkyu jo, updated); Toyo keizai, ed., Kigyo 
keiretsu soran [Firm Keiretsu Overview] (Tokyo:  Toyo keizai, as updated).   
12 For this and other director variables, the data cover those directors who, after serving in management 
elsewhere, are named to the board within 3-4 years of joining a given firm.  The numbers include statutory auditors 
(kansayaku), on the grounds that Japanese discussions of "yakuin" (colloquially translated as "directors") typically 
include the kansayaku. 
13 That is, in most cases, the directors chosen at the first shareholders’ general meeting after the 1980, 1985, 
1990, and 1995 fiscal years.  Because most firms hold their meetings in June and have an April-March fiscal year, the 
1985 directors would be those selected in June 1986, after the end of fiscal 1985 (April 1985-March 1986). Relationship Banking in Japan:  Page 10 
  Concurrent Bankers:  The number of directors on the board with a concurrent 
position at a bank. 
  Past Main-Bankers:  The number of directors on the board with a past career at 
the firm’s main bank.   
  Concurrent Main-Bankers:  The number of directors on the board with a 
concurrent position at the firm’s main bank. 
  Past Banker Increase:  The increase in the number of directors on the board with 
a past career at a bank, from 1980 to 85, from 1985 to 90, and from 1990 to 95. 
  Concurrent Banker Increase:  The increase in the number of directors on the 
board with a concurrent position at a bank, from 1980 to 85, from 1985 to 90, and from 
1990 to 95. 
  Total Banker Increase:  The increase in the number of directors on the board 
with a past career or concurrent position at a bank, from 1980 to 85, from 1985 to 90, and 
from 1990 to 95. 
  Board Size:  The number of directors. 
 
  2.  Financial variables. --  
  ROI:  Total annual shareholder returns on investment (annual rate of appreciation 
in stock price plus dividends received) for 1980-85, 1985-90 and 1990-95. 
  Profitability:  The ratio of a firm’s operating income (#95 of the Nikkei NEEDS 
data base) to total assets (#89) for each year, averaged over 1980-85, 1986-90, and 1990-
94. 
  Positive Profits:  1 if a firm’s Profitability were positive, 0 otherwise, for 1980-
85, 1986-90, and 1990-94. 
 Growth:  The annual growth rate, in percentage, of a firm’s total assets, averaged 
over 1980-85, 1986-90, and 1990-94. 
  Total Assets:  The average total assets of a firm (#89) over 1980-85, 1986-90, 
and 1990-94, in million yen. 
  Tangible Assets/TA:  The average ratio of a firm's tangible assets (#21) to total 
assets (#89) over 1980-85, 1986-90, and 1990-94. 
  Leverage:  The average ratio of a firm's total liabilities (#77) to total assets (#89) 
over 1980-85, 1986-90, and 1990-94. 
  Total Bank Loans:  The average total of a firm's bank loans, over 1980-85, 1986-
90, and 1990-94, in million yen. 
  Total Bank Loan Increase:  The increase (as a fraction) of a firm’s bank loans, 
within the periods 1980-85, 1986-90, and 1990-94. 
  MB Loan Fraction:  The mean fraction of a firm’s bank loans from its main bank, 
for 1980-85, 1986-90, and 1990-94. 
  MB Loan Fraction Increase:  The increase (as a fraction) of a firm's bank loans 
from its main bank, within the periods 1980-85, 1986-90, and 1990-94. 
  MB Change:  1 if the identity of a firm’s main bank changed, for 1980-85, 1986-
90, and 1990-94. 
 
  3.  Industry dummies. --  Dummy variables for affiliation in the construction (113 
firms), trade (164), service and finance (78) (but excluding banks), utilities (101) Relationship Banking in Japan:  Page 11 
(including transportation and real estate), light industry (150), chemical (170), machinery 
(324), and metals (126) industries. 
 
III.  The Results 
A.  Monitoring by Main Banks: 
 1.    Introduction. -- According to the conventional accounts, main banks dominate 
the firms for which they serve as main bank by posting their officers to the boards of the 
firms.  In fact, they almost never do so.  For each of the four years on which we have 
board composition data (1980, 1985, 1990, 1995), 92 to 96 percent of the firms had no 
main bank officer on their board (Tab. 2, Pan. A.). 
  [Insert Table 2 about here.]   
  Fundamentally, scholars and journalists confuse bank officers with retired bank 
officers.  If a bank wanted to use board representation to monitor, it would not rely on 
someone who had quit the bank, had no plans to return to the bank, and depended instead 
on the firm for his future livelihood.  Instead, it would place someone currently on the 
bank payroll who forfeits his future career at the bank if he proves disloyal.   
  Yet to the extent firms name anyone from the banking sector to the board, they 
name retired bankers.  During our four years, 53 to 56 percent of the firms had a retired 
bank officer on their board, and 38 to 40 percent had a retired officer from their main 
bank.  Even retired bankers, however, the firms do not name many.  The mean firm had 
1.1 retired bank officers on its board.  It had only 0.2 to 0.3 directors serving at a bank 
concurrently. 
 
  2.  Determinants of banker appointments. -- Why do the firms that do name 
bankers to the board name them?  Most firms appoint only bankers who have no 
incentive to stay loyal to the bank, many firms appoint no bankers at all, and those that do 
appoint bankers appoint too few to let them "dominate" governance.  But why do the 
firms name any bankers?
14 
  
  (a) The Kaplan & Minton hypothesis.  According to Kaplan & Minton (1994), 
firms appoint the bankers because banks use board appointments to monitor declining 
borrowers.
15  Banks place their officers and retired officers on a borrower’s board, they 
imply, when the borrower falls into distress.  Once there, the bankers then pressure the 
distressed firm to replace its CEO.   
  Kaplan & Minton assemble board composition and financial data on the 119 
largest TSE-listed firms from 1980 to 1988.  They then use logit regressions on the panel 
data to estimate the likelihood that a firm will appoint a new banker-director.  A firm is 
more likely to do so, they find:  (a) if it earned low stock returns the previous year 
(similarly, Morck & Nakamura, 1999), or (b) if it had a pre-tax loss (a dichotomous 
variable) that year.  They locate no evidence that a firm's pre-tax income (as a continuous 
variable) predicts banker appointments. 
                     
14 In this section, we address the Kaplan & Minton (1994) hypothesis.  In fact, firms appear to appoint retired 
bankers primarily because of the financial expertise they bring.  We address this issue in far greater detail in Miwa & 
Ramseyer (2003a). 
15 Many of the criticisms below of Kaplan & Minton (1994) apply as well to the non-technical summary of 
the research that appears in Kaplan & Ramseyer (1996). Relationship Banking in Japan:  Page 12 
 
  (b) The puzzle.  These are puzzling results.  Rational shareholders would not 
radically change their governance structure after either a one-year stock return drop or a 
one-year accounting loss.  Neither would a rational creditor radically change its 
monitoring strategy.  Instead, rational shareholders (as principals) and managers (as 
agents) would have tried to structure their relationship ex ante to align the managers' 
incentives with shareholder preferences.   
  Granted, shareholders will never align their managers' incentives perfectly.  If 
they cannot observe managerial effort or ability, they may then sometimes choose to 
reward or punish their managers after the fact.  Yet if they do have access to information 
about either effort or ability, they will use that information rather than outcome measures.  
When forced nonetheless to rely on outcome, they will choose measures with as little 
noise as possible.   
  For several reasons, most Japanese firms have both (a) relatively reliable 
information about effort and ability, and (b) less noisy indices of outcome.  Most 
Japanese firms pick most executives through internal tournaments rather than recruit 
them on the lateral market.  Necessarily, they will usually have elaborate information 
about the ability and work habits of their senior managers.  
  Japanese firms will also have access to less noisy indices of performance than 
either shareholder returns or pre-tax losses.  Returns fluctuate widely, both by year and 
by industry.  The correlation of ROI is -.51 between 1980-85 and 1985-90, and -.40 
between 1985-90 and 1990-95.  A regression of 1985-90 ROI on prior period ROI yields 
an R squared of 26 percent, and of 1995-90 ROI on the prior period of 15 percent.   
Within 1985-90, mean ROI ranged from 32.5 in construction, 21.8 in light industry, to 
16.7 in chemicals.   
  Pre-tax losses are even more haphazard.  By their nature losses are transitory.  A 
"firm has an abandonment put option to discontinue the loss-making ... operation and 
recoup the book value of the firm's assets," explains Kothari (2001: 132-33).  "So, only 
firms expecting to improve will continue operations, which means that observed losses 
would be temporary."  Precisely because they are transitory, losses bear but a tenuous 
relation to a firm's expected cash flows.  Whether among U.S. firms (Hayn, 1995) or 
Japanese (Obinata, 2003: 14-16), losses have but a loose association to stock prices.
16 
  If all this is true (i.e., if firms choose their governance structures to align the 
incentives of their officers and shareholders, and monitor officers by more finely turned 
measures than loss years) then we should observe no statistically significant relation 
between director turnover and accounting losses.  Although this is not a happy situation 
for the empiricist, it is one he often faces when markets work well.  If markets clear, for 
example, producers will rarely earn extra profits (a principle about which Stigler [1963: 
54] declared that “[t]hat there is no more important proposition in economic theory”) -- 
but the empiricist cannot prove the point through significant results.  If they impound 
information quickly, stock makets will be informationally efficient -- but the empiricist 
will not have significant results to prove it (Fama, 1998).  Our claim -- that Japanese 
                     
16 Firms with low profitability tend to rebound quickly (Fama & French, 2000), and thus one would not 
expect firms to respond to the loss by restructuring themselves.  In fact, of course, accounting earnings are problematic 
for a host of other reasons as well (e.g., Hayn, 1995: 125-26).  For a more general critique of the literature tying 
accounting data to stock returns, see Holthausen & Watts (2001). Relationship Banking in Japan:  Page 13 
firms will choose governance structures that align managerial and shareholder incentives 
reasonably well -- is exactly such a claim:  markets work effectively. 
 
  (c) Our exercise.  To explore these puzzles in more detail, we replicate the 
Kaplan-Minton study but from a different vantage.  First, where they use data only on the 
119 largest TSE firms, we study all Section 1 firms (the largest 900-1,000 firms).  Second, 
where they end their study in 1988, we extend it through 1994.  This lets us study 
purported bank monitoring in both good times and bad. 
  Third, where Kaplan & Minton group retired bank officers with those holding 
concurrent bank appointments, we disentangle the two.  The two groups do face 
fundamentally different incentives:  retired bankers will never again work at the bank, 
while concurrent bankers have careers that hinge on their loyalty to it.  If a bank puts 
people on boards to monitor borrowers on its behalf, it ought primarily to use current 
officers rather than those who have quit. 
  Fourth, where Kaplan & Minton use a panel dataset, we use semi-decanal 
averages.  Although this forces us to regress board changes on performance in the same 
period, it lets us ask whether any apparent governance shift is more than temporary.  
Simultaneously, it lets us ask whether those governance shifts that are long-term reflect 
long-term performance patterns. 
  Fifth, where Kaplan & Minton use a binary variable equal to 1 if a firm appointed 
any new banker-director (analogously, Morck & Nakamura, 1999), we use a continuous 
variable that reflects the net change in banker representation on the board.  This lets us 
capture shifts in the magnitude of the banking industry's representation on the board.   
  Our net change measure also lets us focus on those banker appointments that 
genuinely alter bank representation.  As Kaplan & Minton (1994: 233) note, 45 percent of 
the new bankers merely replace other bankers.  Forty-five percent of the data points in 
their dependent variable, in other words, capture appointments that do nothing to change 
the level of banker representation on the boards.
17   
  Sixth, where Kaplan & Minton (1994: 228) base their accounting measures on 
"current or pre-tax income," we use "operating income."  This is not a trivial distinction.  
For the typical firm, operating income (which is also before taxes) will equal its revenues 
less costs of goods sold, direct selling expenses, advertising costs, and R&D.  To derive 
its “pre-tax income,” it will make a variety of additional discretionary adjustments both in 
non-operating income and expenses and in extraordinary gains and losses.   
  Because of this discretionary element to the calculation of pre-tax income, pre-tax 
income typically shows a much looser association than operating income to stock returns.  
Obinata (2003: 12-14), for instance, tests the association between stock prices and 
various accounting measures in Japan.  As logic would suggest, he finds substantially 
greater association between rates of return on stock and operating income than between 
rates of return and pre-tax income. 
  Last, where Kaplan & Minton use only year dummies as additional explanatory 
variables, we add further controls.  Because a firm’s willingness to appoint an outside 
                     
17 Arguably, those 45 percent merely add noise.  Yet to the extent that losses continue for two or three years, 
the Kaplan-Minton approach introduces bias as well.  If losses affect board appointments, they will likely affect 
appointments for 2 or 3 years.  In such a world, Kaplan & Minton's panel approach potentially counts the loss year 
twice or more.   Relationship Banking in Japan:  Page 14 
director may vary with the total number of directors, we include Board Size.  Because 
that willingness may also vary with a borrower's size and leverage, we include Total 
Assets, Leverage,  and Total Bank Loan Increase.  Because a borrower’s ability to 
provide mortgageable assets may reduce the need for monitoring by a lender, we include 
Tangible Assets/TA.  Because any bank's interest in monitoring a firm may depend on 
the extent to which the firm has diversified its borrowings, we include MB Loan 
Fraction.  And because all this may vary from sector to sector, we include seven industry 
dummies (the omitted industry is metals).   
  For our dependent variable, we use the change in the number of past, concurrent, 
and total bankers on the board over each of our three periods:  Past Banker Increase, 
Concurrent Banker Increase, and Total Banker Increase, over 1980-85, 1985-90, and 
1990-95.  We focus on the two right-hand variables closest to those that Kaplan & 
Minton find significant:  a firm’s stock returns (ROI), and a dummy variable equal to 1 if 
a firm’s profitability is positive (Positive Profits).  To explore whether banks respond 
quickly or more deliberately, we alternately regress our dependent variable on (a) the 
independent variables for the same half decade and (b) on those variables for the 
preceding half decade.   
  Readers may note that a firm’s stock market performance is plausibly endogenous 
to the firm’s expected board appointments.  That endogeneity, however, is not unique to 
our specification.  Instead, it is basic to the Kaplan & Minton study that we replicate here. 
  We report our coefficients and t-statistics on Table 4.
18  For our first set of results 
(Panel A), we include coefficients and t-statistics for all variables (Panel A).  To conserve 
space, for the rest of our results we report the coefficients and t-statistics only for our key 
performance variables. 
  [Insert Table 3 about here.] 
  [Insert Table 4 about here.] 
 
  (d) Our results.  Summary measures.  Simple summary statistics raise doubts 
about Kaplan & Minton's results.  At least by the simple metrics of Table 3, for example, 
the data show little evidence that banks appoint bankers as monitors to the boards of 
troubled firms.  During all periods, most firms -- whether profitable or unprofitable -- 
choose not to change the number of bankers on their boards.  Although some firms do 
increase the number of bankers, about the same number reduce them.  What is more -- 
and contrary to the bank-monitoring hypothesis -- the firms that increase their bankers are 
not disproportionately underperformers.  Instead, profitable firms sometimes increase 
their banker directors too.  Whether the least profitable firms appoint more or fewer 
bankers seems to vary both by the period involved, and by whether we examine retired or 
concurrent bankers.  In all periods and for both categories of bankers, however, most 
firms leave the number of banker directors unchanged. 
  
 Regression  results.  Whether the Kaplan-Minton effect appears in regression 
analysis similarly depends on the dataset and regression specifications.  According to 
Table 4, virtually all the coefficients on the performance variables are insignificant.  Most 
obviously, all regressions on prior period performance are insignificant.  This is 
                     
18 We use OLS rather than Poisson both because the Increase variables can take negative values, and because 
of the reasons given in [this note + 2], infra.   Relationship Banking in Japan:  Page 15 
consistent with Kaplan & Minton, who conclude that the banks respond almost 
instantaneously.   
  More curiously, however, all regressions -- whether on prior- or current-period 
performance -- using Past Banker Increase and Total Banker Increase are also 
insignificant.  Kaplan & Minton obtain significant results with a dependent variable that 
captures any new banker appointment, whether a retired banker or one still holding a 
bank post.  By contrast, in Table 4 only Concurrent Banker Increase yields significant 
results.  These, moreover, are haphazard:  although the coefficient on Positive Profits is 
significantly negative (as Kaplan & Minton predict) in two of the three periods, for one 
period the coefficient on ROI is significant and positive -- exactly the opposite of what 
Kaplan & Minton find. 
  Although this possible focus on concurrent rather than retired banker-directors is 
consistent with bank monitoring (given the different incentives the two groups face), it 
highlights the peripheral nature of any such phenomenon.  At root, concurrent bankers 
are few and far between.  Of all our firms, 82-86 percent had no such directors (Tab. 2).  
Even most loss firms had none.  Of the 14 loss firms in 1980-84, 11 had no concurrent 
banker-directors; of the 43 loss firms in 1985-90, 40 had none; and of the 48 in 1990-94, 
41 had none. 
 
  Kaplan & Minton.  Indeed, the Kaplan-Minton result itself hinges on small 
numbers.  To replicate their study more closely, we tried restricting our sample to the 
largest 100 firms.  We abandoned it, though, when we found that none of the 100-biggest 
firms had negative earnings for the first (1980-84) five-year period.  In the second period, 
only one did, and in the third only three.   
  According to Kaplan & Minton themselves, their panel dataset included 933 firm-
years.  Of those observations, 8.8 percent involved negative earnings (82 firm-years), and 
7.5 percent involved a new banker appointment (70 firm years).  Kaplan & Minton 
calculate that the odds of appointing a banker increased at the loss firms from 7.5 percent 
for the sample at large by an additional 12.9 percentage points.
19  Apparently, the firms 
subject to the 82 loss firm-years appointed about 17 bankers.  Absent the extra 12.9 
percent, they would have appointed 6. During the 9 years Kaplan & Minton studied (and 
given average director tenure of about 8 years), their 119 firms would have appointed 
over 2,000 directors.  Their loss-based evidence for bank monitoring, however, lies in 11 
extra bankers appointed during those 9 years.   
  
  (e) Stock measures rather than flow.  Might the reason under-performing firms do 
not increase their banker-directors more dramatically be that they already have plenty?  
Might the right measure of bank monitoring, in other words, be not the "flow" of new 
directors but the "stock"?   
  To explore this possibility, we regress the total number of past and concurrent 
banker-directors on our Table 4 independent variables.  As our dependent variable, we 
use the number of banker-directors at the beginning and end of each period, and as 
                     
19 Morck & Nakamura (1999: 366) obtain what are apparently even smaller effects:  a fall in performance 
from the industry median to the lowest quartile raises the probability of a banker appointment from 6.3 percent to 6.7 
percent, and a fall to the lowest decile raises it to 6.8 percent. Relationship Banking in Japan:  Page 16 
independent variables we use the mean figures for the half decade.
20  Again, we follow 
Kaplan & Minton in focusing on Positive Profits and ROI.  We present the results in 
Table 5. 
  [Insert Table 5 about here.] 
  We find these results haphazard enough to raise doubts about this "stock" version 
of the bank-monitoring hypothesis.  Table 4 (as well as basic theory) suggests that if 
banks do use board appointments to monitor, they would use concurrent rather than 
retired officers.  Yet Table 5 Panel II.A. indicates that the concurrent bankers are not in 
the loss firms.  Instead, they serve at the better-performing firms.  Only with retired 
bankers do we find any evidence that they might have been more common among the 
poorer performing firms, and then only for the 1980-85 period (Panel I.B.).
21 
 
  (f) An alternative explanation.  Although Kaplan & Minton interpret their results 
as bank monitoring, those very results suggest another hypothesis:  perhaps they locate 
evidence of more fundamental restructuring at the very worst-performing firms.  Perhaps, 
in other words, the shareholders at the most troubled firms sacked all or most of their 
directors, and then appointed new bankers at the same time that they replaced the others.  
Because Kaplan & Minton only coded directoral appointments for bankers and a few 
others, they would not have noticed the rest of the new appointments.  Yet the firms 
would have replaced the bankers for the same reasons they replaced the rest -- and 
Kaplan & Minton's conclusion would simply reflect the data they chose to collect at the 
outset.   
  Consider the two alternatives in more detail.  If banks placed bankers on the 
boards of troubled firms to monitor on their behalf, then economic distress (a) would 
trigger the appointment of additional bankers, but (b) would not trigger the replacement 
of existing bankers with new ones.  Conversely, if the most troubled firms sometimes 
replaced their entire board, then (provided they kept the ratio of bankers to non-bankers 
constant) economic distress (a) would trigger the replacement of existing bankers, but (b) 
would not trigger the appointment of any additional bankers.  Consistent with the latter 
hypothesis but not the former, Kaplan & Minton find that loss firms do appoint new 
bankers while we find that they do not appoint additional bankers.  
  Kaplan & Minton focus on firms that post a loss year -- and some evidence does 
suggest that firms time their losses to coincide with restructuring.  In the U.S., for 
example, when new senior executives take over troubled companies they sometimes 
                     
20 In the first column of Table 5, for example, we regress Past Banker for 1980 on the 1980-84 independent 
variables, and in the second column regress 1985 Past Banker on the same independent variables.   
We stress our OLS results rather than Poisson because of the stringent requirements relating to the mean and 
variance of the data for use of the latter.  See Greene (1997: 937).  However, for reference we include the Poisson 
results as Appendix A-2. 
21   In unreported regressions, we use Profitability rather than Positive Profits.  Where the dependent 
variable is the increase in banker-directors, all coefficients on Profitability yield t-statistics in analogous regressions of 
under 2.  The coefficient is negative in 10 specifications, and positive in 5 (we alternatively regress the banker increase 
on current and past period profits).  Where the dependent variable is Past Banker, the coefficient on Profitability is 
uniformly negative.  The t-statistic is above 2 when we regress 1985 bankers on 1986-90 Profitability and 1990 
bankers on 1990-94 Profitability.  Where the dependent variable is Current Banker, the coefficient on Profitability 
is uniformly positive.  The t-statistic is above 2 when we regress 1990 bankers on 1986-90 Profitability and on 1990-
94 Profitability.   Relationship Banking in Japan:  Page 17 
accelerate discretionary expenses to post a "big bath."
22   In Japan, departing senior 
executives of troubled companies are said sometimes to accelerate losses on their way out.  
If departing executives did choose to accelerate losses, Kaplan & Minton's pre-tax 
income would reflect it.  Because pre-tax income comes net a variety of discretionary 
gains and losses, Japanese CEOs hoping to defer a loss can do so by defering 
depreciation allowances or selling appreciated stock.  CEOs determined to post a "big 
bath" can do the opposite.   
  Take the shipbuilding industry in the late 1980s.  Although firms in most 
industries did well in the 1980s, shipbuilding firms found themselves in crisis.  By the 
middle of the decade, the tanker sales boom caused by the earlier oil price hikes had 
collapsed.  In compiling their accounting statements, the firms then took a variety of 
tacks.  According to securities filings, Kawasaki Heavy Industries had positive operating 
profits in 1984 and 1986, but posted pre-tax losses.  Mitsui Shipbuilding had operating 
losses of 28 billion yen in 1988, but increased its "non-operating income" and 
"extraordinary gains" to post a pre-tax gain.  Hitachi Shipbuilding had operating losses of 
37 billion that year, but similarly accrued "extraordinary gains" to post a pre-tax gain. 
  Those firms that did decide to post a pre-tax loss sometimes also replaced their 
board.  As Table 6 shows, all but one of the principal shipbuilders posted at least one 
loss-year over 1986-88.  Several also had high board turnover.  In general, Japanese 
directors serve an average of eight years.  Had they done so here, the firms would have 
had annual board turnover rates of 12 percent, and over the two years would have 
replaced about a quarter of their directors.  Of the eight shipbuilding firms, only 
Kawasaki replaced fewer than a quarter.  Two firms replaced about 30 percent, and two 
replaced about 40.  Mitsubishi (with no loss years) replaced half, and two others replaced 
almost all.   
  [Insert Table 6 about here.]  
  The loss firms that replaced their board did not necessarily appoint additional 
bankers.  Despite the many changes the shipbuilding firms made to their boards, two 
firms cut the number of bankers on their board, and three kept it unchanged.  One firm 
increased its banker directors by 1, and two increased them by 3.   
  As the shipbuilding example illustrates, board appointments at loss firms need not 
show that "pressures from banks, corporate shareholders, and corporate groups play an 
important role in linking firm performance and managerial rewards" (Kaplan & Minton, 
1994: 257).  Instead, the appointments may just reflect a more general restructuring.   For 
sometimes, a loss firm will replace most of its board -- banker and non-banker alike.
23  
Kaplan & Minton call the banker appointments a proxy for bank pressure.  If the 
shipbuilding example generalizes to other industries, however, their conclusion may 
simply reflect their initial coding choice:  they may be calling the phenomenon bank 
pressure only because bankers were the directors whose appointments they chose to code.   
 
B.  Delegation of Monitoring: 
                     
22 E.g., Kothari (2001: 133); Pourciau (1993); Murphey & Zimmerman (1993).  Not all studies reach this 
conclusion. 
23  Though the coefficient on earnings loss for appointments of directors from other corporations is not 
statistically significant in Kaplan & Minton (1994). Relationship Banking in Japan:  Page 18 
  The conventional accounts also posit that the main bank serves as exclusive 
monitor:  rather than waste resources in duplicative monitoring, secondary banks delegate 
all monitoring to a firm’s main bank.  Suppose banks did make these arrangements.  If 
current and retired banker-directors monitor on behalf of banks, then virtually all banker 
directors should come from a firm’s main bank.  
  Suppose, however, that secondary banks do not delegate their monitoring to the 
main bank.  Given that the cost-effective level of monitoring will rise with the amount of 
money at stake, the bank that has lent the most (by definition, the “main bank”) will still 
generate the most banker-directors.  Because the other banks also lend substantial sums 
(the mean firm borrowed 29 to 33 percent of its bank debt from its main bank), however, 
these other banks will send substantial number of directors as well.   
  Our data show no evidence that secondary banks delegate monitoring to the main 
bank.  In 1985, for example, our firms recruited only 57 percent of their retired banker-
directors from their main bank.  The mean firm had about 1.1 directors who had retired 
from any bank, but only 0.6 who had retired from its main bank.  It had about 0.2 who 
concurrently worked at any bank, but only 0.04 to 0.08 who concurrently worked at its 
main bank. 
 
C.  Main Bank Rescues: 
 1.    Introduction.  By most accounts, Japanese banks implicitly agree to rescue 
those distressed clients for which they act as main bank.  Although scholars vary in what 
they consider a rescue, many claim that the main bank agrees to lend the firm money 
even when other banks would refuse.  The claim appears routinely, but is bedevilingly 
hard to test.   
  The claim is hard to test because it posits only an "implicit" deal -- no firm or 
bank actually negotiates such an agreement.  And even in Japan, firms do fail routinely 
(Miwa & Ramseyer, 2002a: 418).  Even there, banks do not necessarily rescue troubled 
clients.  Absent identifiable contracts, the easy response to a bank that jettisons a 
distressed client is to claim ex post that the firm must not have had a main bank ex ante.  
  Some observers attribute the rescue obligation only to the more committed main 
banks (e.g., Sunamura, 1994: 298), but this only compounds the problem.
24  Absent a 
way to identify “strong” ties ex ante, the easy response is -- again -- to turn the claim 
tautological:  if a bank does not rescue a firm ex post, the firm must not have had strong 
ties with the bank ex ante. 
  Still other proponents claim that main banks agree to rescue only economically 
viable firms (Aoki, 2000: ch. 5; Patrick, 1994: 399), but this variant is almost as non-
testable as the others.  Suppose a bank does not rescue a given firm.  If the firm survives 
anyway, it must not have been truly distressed -- and the bank would have faced no 
obligation to rescue.  If the firm fails, it must not have been economically viable -- and as 
it has now disappeared, that non-viability is almost impossible to contest.   
  To date, even main bank theorists have not tried systematically to show that these 
rescue agreements exist.  They instead collect only anecdotes.  To be sure, they collect 
many.  In one study alone, Sheard (1994: 213-26) lists 42.  Yet absent a more systematic 
approach, the anecdotes show only that some banks sometimes rescue some firms -- and 
                     
24 Some observers use a firm's purported keiretsu affiliation as a proxy for relational strength, but this fails for 
reasons we discuss in Miwa & Ramseyer (2002b). Relationship Banking in Japan:  Page 19 
that, of course, is beside the point.  Try as creditors might to avoid the quandary, 
sometimes they find that lending a defaulting debtor extra funds or renegotiating an debt 
will cut their losses.  That they sometimes do either does not mean they agreed to rescue 
ex ante.  It may just mean they failed to notice the firm’s travails until it was too late to 
pull their loans. 
  Given these problems, we take a different approach.  We first survey the extent to 
which firms rely on their lead banks for loans (Subsection 2).  We ask which firms switch 
their lead banks (Subsection 3), and which increase the amounts they borrow from them 
(Subsections 4).  We conclude by examining lead bank loans to a smaller sample of more 
seriously distressed firms (Subsection 5). 
 
  2.  Main bank dependence.  Suppose main banks provide implicit insurance 
policies against financial or economic distress.  The firms most likely to be "collecting" 
on the policy will be those closest to insolvency.  If so, then on average the nearly 
insolvent firms should be borrowing a larger fraction of their loans from their lead bank 
than the other firms. 
  In fact, the least profitable firms do not borrow more from their lead bank than 
other firms.  Consider Table 7.  To construct the table, we partition the firms by their 
profitability (the columns) and by the total amounts they borrow from banks (the rows).  
For each of the resulting 16 cells, we then calculate the mean of the fraction of bank debt 
that the firms borrow from their main bank.  We give the number of firms in each cell in 
parenthesis.  We exclude firms that change their main bank during the period (generating 
uneven quartile sizes).  Thus, in 1980-85, there were 12 firms that (i) did not change their 
main bank affiliation, (ii) were in the least profitable quartile, and (iii) were in the 
quartile that borrowed the least from banks.  These 12 firms borrowed a mean .493 of 
their bank loans from their main bank.   
  At least during the 1980s, we find that the least profitable firms may have 
borrowed less from their main bank than their more profitable peers.  During 1980-85, 
the 186 firms in the least profitable quartile borrowed 27.8 percent of their loans from 
their lead bank, while the firms in the other three quartiles borrowed 30.6; during 1986-
90, firms in the least profitable quartile borrowed 32.0 percent from their lead bank while 
the others borrowed 33.9.  Only during 1990-94 did the least profitable borrow more:  
then, they borrowed 34.4 percent while the others borrowed 33.8.  None of the 
differences are significant at the 5 percent level, and the main bank loan fraction figures 
in Table 7 do not fall from left to right as the bank rescue hypothesis would predict. 
  [Insert Table 7 about here.] 
  Given the asymmetric information among banks, all else equal firms might find it 
more efficient to borrow only from one bank.  After all, the major Japanese banks are big 
enough to handle the debt of most of these firms.  Nonetheless, they do not.  Apparently, 
the firms worry about exactly the monopoly power that relationship-banking theory 
posits banks have, and diversify their loans to make certain they do not face it.   
  Because borrowing from any given bank does involve substantial fixed costs, 
however, a firm borrowing large amounts will more often find it cost-effective to borrow 
from several sources than will a firm borrowing less.  If so, then the extent to which firms 
diversify their borrowing will increase with the total amounts they borrow.  So Table 7 
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  To clarify the correlation between outstanding debt levels and loan diversification 
(we do not claim to test causation), we offer a simple OLS regression of MB Loan 
Fraction on Total Loans (the source of the Table 7 quartiles) and Profitability:
25 
1980-85:  MB Ln Frac = .273 - 1.23 Tot Loans + .551 Profitability 
          (16.64)       (3.55)               (2.19) 
1986-90:  MB Ln Frac = .319 - .775 Tot Loans + .442 Profitability 
           (18.51)      (3.25)               (1.38) 
1990-94:  MB Ln Frac = .336 - .280 Tot Loans + .168 Profitability 
           (20.14)      (1.81)               (0.45) 
As logic predicts, for each of the periods MB Loan Fraction is negatively associated 
with Total Loans -- during the 1980s at more than the 1 percent level and during the 
early 1990s at 10 percent.  Contrary to the implications of main bank monitoring, it is if 
anything positively correlated with Profitability. 
  In creating Table 7, we drop those firms that changed main banks during a given 
period.  If we re-run our regressions on the entire sample with MB Change as an 
additional explanatory variable, we obtain:   
1980-85:  MB Ln Frac = .270 - 1.36 Tot Loans + .608 Profitability - .057 MB Change 
          (17.56)     (3.70)                  (2.62)                   (5.75) 
1986-90:  MB Ln Frac = .322 - .847 Tot Loans + .393 Profitability - .062 MB Change 
          (21.26)     (3.28)                  (1.44)                   (4.79) 
1990-94:  MB Ln Frac = .329 - .384 Tot Loans + .392 Profitability - .067 MB Change 
          (23.24)     (2.14)                  (1.37)                   (5.47) 
The results remain largely unchanged:  MBLoan Fraction is associated with Total 
Loans negatively, and with Profitability positively if at all.  As one might expect, those 
firms that change main bank affiliation borrow a smaller fraction of their debt from their 
lead bank.   
  Table 7 suggests two related observations, both of which imply that economically 
distressed firms do not collect on any bank-rescue insurance policy.  First, among the 
firms most dependent on their main bank (the quartile with the least outstanding debt, 
where the MBLoan Fraction is highest), in each of the three periods more firms are in 
the profitable half than the unprofitable (for 1980-85, 93 firms compared to 32).  Among 
the firms that borrow the most (very high outstanding debt), during the 1980s the most 
profitable firms relied more on their main bank (.292 for 1980-85) than the least (.215).  
More basically, neither comparison -- nor any other aspect of Table 7 of which we are 
aware -- suggests main banks offer distressed firms extra loans.   
 
  3.  Main bank stability. -- If main banks offer implicit insurance policies against 
financial distress, then the firms closest to insolvency should have the most stable 
relationship with their main bank.  After all, a healthy 35 year-old might switch life 
insurance firms, but not a terminally ill 80 year-old.  By hypothesis, the troubled firm has 
paid the main bank its implicit insurance premia for years.  At the very point at which it 
might collect on its implicit policy against financial distress, it will not cancel that 
insurance coverage and look for another carrier.   
                     
25 The absolute values of the Huber-White corrected robust t-statistics are in parenthesis.  The coefficients on 
Total Loans are multiplied by 10
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  If financially distressed firms do switch main banks, they do so either because the 
main bank has reneged on its rescue obligation or because it never offered coverage 
against distress in the first place.  In fact, the two explanations come to much the same 
thing:  if main banks regularly renege, no rational firm would pay the necessary premia 
ex ante; if no firms pay the premia, no rational bank would offer the rescue package ex 
post.  If distressed firms regularly switch main banks, firms and main banks must not be 
contracting for insurance.   
  To explore these issues, in Panel A of Table 8 we calculate the percentage of 
firms in the lowest profitability quartile who change main bank affiliation during our 
three periods.  We further compare that percentage with those of the top three quartiles.  
Lest we exaggerate the extent of the main bank shifts, we code as "main bank change" 
only those shifts that are definite.  Where the data leave main bank affiliation unclear, we 
instead code the relationship as stable.  For expositional simplicity, we do not partition 
firms by loan size.  Instead, we simply extract the firms most likely to be collecting on 
their rescue insurance (the least profitable firms) and compare them against all others.  
  [Insert Table 8 about here.] 
  According to Panel A, main bank relations are not stable.  For each of the half-
decades, a fifth to a third of the firms switch their main banks.  This is true not just of the 
higher performing firms but of those in the lowest quartile as well.  The differences 
between the lowest quartile and the others are not significant at the 5 percent level. 
  Neither is a firm's propensity to switch main banks tied to its profitability.  The 
correlation between Profitability and Main Bank Change is uniformly insignificant.  
Firms that switch once do tend disproportionately to switch again, however.  Of the firms 
that switched main banks in 1980-85, 43 percent switched again in 1986-90 (but only 12 
percent of the others).  Of the firms that switched main banks in 1986-90, 58 percent 
switched again in 1990-94 (and 20 percent of the others).   
  As in the previous subsection, to explore the correlations (not causation) more 
closely we offer some simple OLS regressions: 
1980-85:  MB Change = .309 - 2.12 Tot Lns + .208 Profitability 
          (11.77)     (2.71)            (.063) 
1986-90:  MB Change = .221 - 1.23 Tot Lns + .048 Profitability 
          (10.53)     (4.35)            (0.14) 
1990-94:  MB Change = .268 - 1.24 Tot Lns + .820 Profitability 
          (11.03)     (5.10)            (1.59)    
1986-90:  MB Change = .128 - .811 Tot Lns - .028 Profitability + .322 80-85MB Change 
          (6.60)       (3.42)            (0.09)                    (10.04) 
1990-94:  MB Change = .186 - .880 Tot Lns + .776 Profitability + .376 86-90MB Change 
          (8.42)       (4.48)            (1.73)                    (10.07) 
As with MB Loan Fraction, MB Change is strongly and negatively correlated with 
Total Loans for all of the three periods.  Whether a firm changed its main bank 
affiliation in one period also strongly predicts whether it will change it again in the next.  
Crucially, however, MB Change is largely not correlated with Profitability.   
 
  4.  Increases in MB Loan Fraction. -- According to the conventional accounts, 
the main bank implicitly agrees to shoulder a disproportionate amount of any extra debt a 
troubled firm may need.  In general, a main bank will be lending to healthy firms in Relationship Banking in Japan:  Page 22 
rough proportion to its outstanding debt.  To distressed firms, however, it should lend 
more than its proportional share.   
  In Panel B of Table 8, we compare (a) the mean increase in the MB Loan 
Fraction for the distressed quartile of firms against (b) the mean increase at all other 
firms.  By the standard accounts, the increase should be larger at the distressed firms than 
the others.  It is not.  Instead, for two of the three periods the main bank increased its debt 
share at the healthy firms more than it increased it at the distressed; for the third period, it 
cut back its share less at the healthy firms than at the distressed (the differences are not 
significant at the 5 percent level).  During the booming 1980s (when by conventional 
wisdom most firms could freely borrow) the main bank lent to the profitable and 
unprofitable firms alike; once firms hit hard times in the 1990s, it may have favored the 
former over the latter.  The moral is simple:  the main bank does not help the least 
profitable firms.  If anything, it avoids them. 
  Suppose a distressed firm needs additional debt:  suppose, in other words, that it is 
economically healthy but financially distressed, and needs additional funds to invest in 
facilities that will help return it to financial health.  If the main bank bears a 
disproportionate share of any additional loans to such firms, then the correlation 
coefficient at those firms between (i) the increase in Total Loans and (ii) the increase in 
MB Loan Fraction should be positive.  In fact, according to Panel C, it is significantly 
negative:  when a distressed firm increases its loans (172 firms in 1980-85, 152 in 1986-
90, and 188 in 1990-94), its main bank tends to fund less than its proportional share of 
the new debt.   
  Among the distressed firms that reduce their total loans (82, 109, and 78 firms, by 
period), the correlation between the increase in Total Loans and MB Loan Fraction is 
also negative.  This is an ambiguous result.  On the one hand, it could reflect main bank 
rescues:  as other banks try to recover their debt before it becomes uncollectable, the 
main bank replaces their loans to help the firm stay in business.  On the other, it could 
also reflect bad main bank management:  the main bank failed to pull its loans as quickly 
as the other banks.  Indeed, it may have become the main bank precisely because of that 
mismanagement -- it may have become the firm's largest lender simply because it did not 
pull its loans as quickly as the others.   
  More basically, Panel C suggests that main banks do not favor distressed over 
profitable firms.  In advancing the rescue hypothesis, theorists effectively claim that main 
banks agree implicitly to favor distressed firms over profitable firms.  In fact, Panel C 
shows little difference in how a main bank responds to the two groups of firms.  Even 
when bottom quartile firms fell on hard times in the 1990s, main banks did not treat them 
more favorably than their profitable competitors. 
 
  5.  Failing firms, pre-1980s firms. -- Finally, to explore bank lending at the most 
troubled firms, we examine loans to the 134 non-financial firms listed in an August 11, 
1984 issue of the Japanese Business-Week equivalent (Shukan toyo keizai) as 
"endangered."  These represent all exchange-listed non-financial firms with at least three 
consecutive loss (after interest but before extraordinary gains and losses) years as of 1984.  
Of the 134, 33 firms had disappeared from the exchanges by 2001, most through merger Relationship Banking in Japan:  Page 23 
but about one-third through bankruptcy.  The sample thus represents a more seriously 
distressed group than our bottom Profitability quartile.
26 
  Again, suppose main banks implicitly agree to lend distressed clients amounts 
they could not obtain elsewhere.  If so, then among our firms a main bank should have 
increased its loan share during the years immediately before 1984.  Consistent with the 
results from Table 8, it did not (Tab. 9).  Among the "endangered" firms, the main bank 
did not increase its share of the outstanding loans.  Instead, it cut it.  What is more, even 
as loans to Japanese businesses grew explosively in the late 1980s (see Tab. 1, Pan. A.), 
loans to these distressed firms stagnated (Tab. 9).   
  Nor was this absence of bank "rescues" a 1980s development.  The 1974 oil crisis 
threw the Japanese economy into a prolonged recession.  With business down, many 
firms posted losses, and as they did the business press published the predictable articles 
about the highest risk firms.  In one April 1978 study, the Toyo keizai tokei geppo printed 
a list of 320 loss firms (i.e., firms with a loss carryforward).  that “make banks tremble.”  
For our purposes, note that the firms exhibited characteristics similar to those in the 1984 
list.  Of the 320 firms, 10.3 percent vanished immediately, and 20.9 percent had not 
recovered six years later:  33 firms disappeared (e.g., by liquidation, by merger, or simply 
by de-listing the stock) within a year, and 67 had remained sufficiently underperforming 
to qualify for the 1984 list.  Of the 33 disappearing firms, 24 had been insolvent. 
  Of the 320 loss firms, 24.1 percent had recently changed main bank affiliation:  
i.e., 77 had shifted their main bank during the preceding three years.  Among the 87 
insolvent firms in the group, 32 (36.8 percent) had changed their main bank, and 24 (27.6 
percent) had disappeared.  Apparently, no bank stepped in to prevent the business 
disruption entailed in de-listing the stock.  And of the 320 firms, consider the 113 with at 
least 10 billion yen debt in 1977.  The records show no systematic evidence of serious 
main bank resues among these firms either:  of the 113, 95 increased their debt during the 
next year, but the main bank increased its share of the debt only at about half of those 95 
(52 firms; raising its mean loan share from 17.3 percent to 24.3 percent), and cut its share 
at the other half (43 firms; lowering its share from 19.9 percent to 15.4 percent).   
 
D.  Deregulation and Depression: 
  1.  The connection. -- To explore the possible connection between the alleged 
deregulation-induced decline of main-bank monitoring in the late 1980s and the 
depression in the 1990s, consider Table 10.
27  To construct this panel, we divide the 
database into quartiles by a firm’s 1986-90 Growth rate (Panel A).  We then provide 
selected summary statistics for each quartile.  For Panel B, we segment the data by a 
firm’s 1990-94 Profitability and collect similar statistics.  In Table 11, we verify our 
conclusions with OLS -- we do so by regressing 1990-94 performance (Profitability and 
                     
26 For sample details and a further critique of the main-bank rescue literature, see Miwa (1996: 115-19). 
27 We take these assumptions as given only for the sake of argument.  In fact, because the earlier regulation of 
lending behavior had not bound, the 1980s deregulation could not have significantly affected bank-borrower ties (Miwa 
& Ramseyer, 2003b).  Given that the "main bank system" had never existed, there was no "main bank monitoring" to 
decline.   
In Miwa & Ramseyer (2003a), we show that board composition did not change during the period at issue.  
Moreover, as Tab. 8 Pan. A., Tab. 10, and note [this + 1] infra of this paper show, bank loan patterns did not 
substantially change.   Relationship Banking in Japan:  Page 24 
Growth, as the dependent variables) on 1986-90 financial variables (including 
Profitability and Growth, as the independent variables). 
  Recall the conventional explanation for the 1990s depression:  due to the earlier 
deregulation, main banks lost the ability to monitor; because of that reduced monitoring, 
firms played the bubble and expanded aggressively; when the bubble burst, the most 
aggressive firms failed.  Theoretically coherent perhaps, the story does not fit the facts.  
Instead, the facts suggest a much more mundane tale:  the best firms grew rapidly in the 
booming 1980s and weathered the troubled 1990s; the worst firms grew only haphazardly 
even during the 1980s, and floundered badly in the 1990s. 
  Most basically, the firms that expanded in the late 1980s did not collapse in the 
early 90s (Tab. 10, Pan. A.2).  Despite the many claims to the contrary, the firms that 
aggressively expanded were not the ones that failed.  Instead, the firms that grew in the 
late 1980s were firms that had faced good projects in the past, and continued to face them 
in the future:  the high-growth firms in the late 1980s were the firms that had grown in 
the early 80s, and that continued to grow into the 90s (Tab. 10, Pan. A.1; Tab. 11).
28   
  These fast-growing firms prospered (Tab. 10, Pan. A.2; Tab. 11).  As befits firms 
facing the best projects, they had been among the most profitable in the early 1980s.  
They stayed profitable into the 90s.   
  The fast-growing firms in the late 1980s grew in part by borrowing heavily.   
Although they maintained lower leverage than the slower growing firms (presumably by 
expanding equity; Tab. 10, Pan. A.3), they dramatically increased the amounts they 
borrowed from banks (Pan. A.4).  Only the slowest growing firms cut their bank loans.  
Predictably, the correlation between 1986-90 Growth and Total Bank Loan Incr is .08 
(significant at the .02 level).   
  The fast-growing firms also borrowed heavily from their principal lender.  Where 
the slowest growing firms borrowed only 30 percent from their principal lender, the 
highest growing quartile borrowed 40 (Tab. 10, Pan. A.5).  The correlation between 
1986-90 MB Loan Fraction and Growth is .13 (significant at .001), and between 1986-
90 MB Loan Increase and Growth is .26 (significant at .001). 
  Not that the fast growing firms attributed any permanence to their “main bank 
ties” (Tab. 10, Pan. A.6).  For each quartile in each half decade, the odds that a firm 
would switch main banks ranged from 15 to 40 percent.  Yet where it ranged between 15 
and 25 percent for the slowest growing firms, it ranged from 20 to 35 percent for the 
fastest.  The correlation between 1986-90 MB Change and Growth is not statistically 
significant.   
  In Panel B of Table 10, we undertake the reverse exercise:  we segment the 
database by 1990-94 Profitability and trace the firms' antecedents.  Preliminarily, note 
that firms were far from universally troubled even during the putative 1990s depression.  
Indeed, the most profitable half earned only marginally lower profits during the 
depressed early 90s than they had during the booming late 80s (Pan. B.2; Miwa & 
Ramseyer, 2003d).  
                     
28 The notion that any substantial disintermediation occurred is itself largely mythical.  From 1979 to 1989, 
the total bank loans outstanding at all listed firms rose from 531 billion yen to 1,034 billion.  Among the largest 30 
borrowers, it rose from 222 billion to 576 billion, and among the largest 10 borrowers from 131 billion to 343 billion.  
The identity of the largest 30 borrowers remained largely unchanged during this period.  Toyo (1991); see Miwa & 
Ramseyer (2003d) for details. Relationship Banking in Japan:  Page 25 
  As in Panel A, Panel B suggests that the firms skirting bankruptcy in the early 
1990s were not firms that had grown rapidly in the late 1980s.  Instead, they were firms 
that had been marginal all along.  They had grown the least in the 80s, and had earned the 
lowest profits (Tab. 10 Pan. B.1; Tab. 11).  Necessarily, they would have had the least 
chance of tapping the bond market, and the least chance of resisting bank intervention.   
 
  2.  Industry-specific data. -- To show that our conclusions are not the artifact of 
aggregating data across industries, in Appendix Table A-1 we add analogous information 
from several industries.  Firm performance did, after all, vary from industry to industry, 
and from period to period.  During 1980-85, for instance, 43.6 percent of the fastest 
growing quartile of firms were in the machinery industry, but only 2.9 percent in the 
construction industry; during 1986-90, 23.6 percent of the fastest quartile were in 
machinery, and 4.5 percent in construction.  During 1980-85, 15.1 percent of the slowest 
growing firms were in machinery, and 15.8 percent in construction; during 1986-90, 28.4 
percent were in machinery, and 4.5 percent in construction.   
  Moreover, in explaining post-war Japanese economic growth observers have often 
focused on the machinery firms, while in addressing the 1990s malaise have focused on 
construction.  For all these reasons, we include quartile data for the machinery firms in 
Panels E and F, and for construction firms in Panels A and B.  To facilitate comparison, 
we add quartile data on the trade industry in Panels C and D.  Largely, the results confirm 
the conclusions we reach on the basis of Table 10. 
 
III.  Conclusions: 
  Relationship banking may indeed matter.  With its present theoretical base in 
information-based “monopoly power," however, it does not matter at exchange-listed 
firms.  It may explain some financing patterns at the small Japanese firms, just as it may 
explain some small-firm finance in the West.  Yet to date, that is not how scholars have 
applied it to Japan.  Instead, they have applied it through tales of a large-firm based 
“main bank system.”   
  Unfortunately for the relationship-banking theorist, that "system" does not exist.  
And at least as applied to Japan through the concept of that “main bank system,” 
relationship banking theory does not explain the 1980s Japanese asset-price increase.  It 
does not explain the 1990s recession, does not appear in any monitoring through boards 
of directors, does not capture any delegation of monitoring duties among banks, and does 
not reflect any implicit contract to rescue troubled borrowers. 
  Japanese firms do sometimes appoint retired bankers to their boards -- but most 
appoint none with a concurrent bank job, the majority of firms have no bankers at all, and 
few have more than one or two.  Banks may sometimes take turns monitoring common 
debtors -- but if they do, no trace of it appears in board appointment patterns.  Japanese 
banks may sometimes bail out troubled firms -- but after all, here or there, doing so 
sometimes lets a bank cut its losses ex post.  And Japanese banks in the 1980s may well 
have spent fewer resources monitoring those borrowers that turned to the bond market -- 
yet those were not the firms that failed.   
  At root, the theory of the Japanese “main bank system” is a theory without a 
phenomenon.  At root, the only charitable interpretation of the system is that it does not 
exist, and probably never did.  Consider it an urban legend, a fable:  a tale we collectively Relationship Banking in Japan:  Page 26 
repeat because we collectively wish it were true.  And we wish it were true because of the 
way it illustrates the economics of information, and its implications for relationship 
banking theory and modern banking theory more generally.   
  Does relationship banking matter?  Perhaps -- perhaps it explains a variety of 
financing patterns among Japanese small firms operating in isolated areas, just as it may 
explain a variety of patterns among small regional firms in the West.  Fundamentally, 
however, with its focus on the “monopoly power” a relational bank acquires over a firm 
through its investment in firm-specific information, relationship banking theory is a 
theory of small-firm finance in non-competitive financial markets.  In their attempt to 
apply the theory to Japan, scholars have focused on the large, exchange-listed firms and 
their mythical “main bank” relationships.  So applied, relationship banking theory 
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Table 1:  Selected Summary Statistics 
 
 
      n    min      mean        max. 
A.  Financial Variables: 
 ROI 
     1980-85   862       0      13.71        66.7 
     1986-90   943   -15.3      21.76        78.6 
     1990-94  1055     -45     -10.76        14.7 
 Profitability 
     1980-85  1163   -0.07       0.07        0.99 
     1986-90  1210   -0.34       0.05        0.45 
     1990-94  1223   -0.13       0.04        0.37 
 Positive  Profits 
     1980-85  1163       0       0.98           1 
     1986-90  1210       0       0.96           1 
     1990-94  1223       0       0.96           1 
 Growth 
     1980-85  1111  -282.9      26.79        89.6 
     1986-90  1154  -59.01      67.78        1200 
     1990-94  1213  -72.90      21.83         569 
 Total  Assets 
     1980-85  1163    1250    163,000   7,520,000 
     1986-90  1210    2060    247,000  10,900,000 
     1990-94  1223    3180    327,000  11,700,000 
 Tangible  Assets/TA 
     1980-85  1163    0.00       0.23        0.85 
     1986-90  1210    0.00       0.24        0.92 
     1990-94  1223    0.00       0.26        0.92 
 Leverage 
     1980-85  1163    0.09       0.71        1.83 
     1986-90  1210    0.09       0.65        2.16 
     1990-94  1223    0.09       0.61        2.21 
  Total Bank Loans 
     1980-85   988      16     56,300   3,370,000 
     1986-90  1030       7     77,400   4,530,000 
     1990-94  1045       0     93,200   4,820,000 
  MB Loan Fraction 
     1980-85  988    0.09       0.29           1 
     1986-90  1030    0.06       0.33           1 
     1990-94  1044       0       0.33           1 
 MB  Change 
     1980-85  1015       0       0.29           1 
     1986-90  1015       0       0.21           1 
     1990-94  1016       0       0.28           1 
 
B.  Board Composition Variables: 
 Past  Bankers   
     1980  1007  0  1.02  12 
     1985  1029  0  1.06  19 
     1990  1134  0  1.06  20 
     1995  1197  0  1.09  17 
 Concurrent  Bankers 
     1980  1007  0  0.25   5 
     1985  1029  0  0.22   6 
     1990  1134  0  0.21   5 
     1995  1197  0  0.21   5 Relationship Banking in Japan:  Page 33 




     n  min  mean  max 
B.  Board Composition Variables (Continued): 
 Past  Main-Bankers 
     1980  1007  0  0.56  10 
     1985  1029  0  0.62  15 
     1990  1134  0  0.60  18 
     1995  1197  0  0.60  17 
 Concurrent  Main-Bankers 
     1980  1007  0  0.08   3 
     1985  1029  0  0.06   6 
     1990  1134  0  0.05   4 
     1995  1197  0  0.05   3 
 Board  Size 
     1980  1007  7  18.24  53 
     1985  1029  6  19.49  54 
     1990  1134  6  21.16  59 




 Sources:  Nikkei QUICK joho, K.K., NEEDS (Tokyo, Nikkei QUICK 
joho, as updated); Nikkei QUICK joho, K.K., QUICK (Tokyo, Nikkei QUICK 
joho, as updated); Nihon shoken keizai kenkyu jo, ed., Kabushiki toshi 
shueki ritsu [Rates of Return on Common Stocks] (Tokyo:  Nihon shoken 
keizai kenkyu jo, updated); Toyo keizai, ed., Kigyo keiretsu soran 
[Firm Keiretsu Overview] (Tokyo:  Toyo keizai, as updated).   
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
 
Table 2:  Bankers and Retired Bankers 
on Corporate Boards 
 
 
     Main Bank     .     Any Bank     . 
  1980  1985  1990 1995 1980 1985  1990 1995 
 
.  Mean number of directors per bank holding -- 
Conc bank appts  .078  .059  .052  .048   .254   .216   .211   .210 
Past  bank  appts .562 .619 .598  .599  1.021 1.060  1.060 1.087 
 
.  Percentage of firms with no directors holding -- 
Conc  bank  appts .927 .949 .956  .954  .820  .846 .854  .851 






 Sources:  See Table 1. Relationship Banking in Japan:  Page 34 
Table 3:  Increases in Bankers and Retired Bankers, 




A.  Number of Firms Showing Decrease, No Change, or Increase in Number of  
    Concurrent Bankers on Board, by Profitability Quartiles: 
 
  Decrease  No Change  Increase  
1.  1980-85 --  
   Very Low  24  228  13 
   Low  21  220  16 
   High  11  229  15 
   Very High  13  163   5 
 
2.  1985-90 --  
   Very Low  17  259  14 
   Low  11  245  15 
   High  13  238  17 
   Very High  10  183   8 
 
3.  1990-95 --  
   Very Low  16  256  27 
   Low  16  268  15 
   High  15  257  17 
   Very High  13  221  13 
 
B.  Number of Firms Showing Decrease, No Change, or Increase in Number of  
    Retired Bankers on Board, by Profitability Quartiles: 
 
1.  1980-85 --  
   Very Low  50  153  62 
   Low  46  161  50 
   High  40  186  29 
   Very High  23  141  17 
 
2.  1985-90 --  
   Very Low  48  186  56 
   Low  62  165  44 
   High  47  172  49 
   Very High  19  145  37 
 
3.  1990-95 --  
   Very Low  55  184  60 
   Low  39  205  55 
   High  44  199  46 




 Notes:  Firms are partitioned by quartiles on the basis of 
Profitability.  The sizes are uneven because not all firms with accounting 
data also have board composition data. 
 
 Sources:  See Table 1. Relationship Banking in Japan:  Page 35 
 
Table 4:  Determinants of Net Increase in 





          80-85    .      86-90    .      90-94    . 
 
I.  Using Past Banker Increase as Dependent Variable: 
 
A.  Same period independent variables 
 
  ROI  -.006    -.001     -.001 
    (1.89)      (0.22)     (0.31) 
  Positive Prof       .002       .076       .110 
        (0.01)     (0.44)     (0.84) 
  Board Size  -.006    -.004  -.010    -.009   .008    .009 
    (0.92)    (0.55)  (1.71)   (1.73)  (0.97) (1.06) 
  Total Asts (106)   .046     .026   .035     .027  -.186   -.191 
    (0.71)    (0.43)  (0.81)   (0.66)  (1.36) (1.39) 
  Leverage    .313    .391  -.216   -.096  -.440    -.497 
    (1.21)    (1.61)  (0.89)   (0.43)  (1.72) (1.95) 
  Tang At/TA  -.619    -.496   .272     .275  -.073   -.019 
    (2.30)    (2.03)  (0.87)   (0.97)  (0.16) (0.04) 
  Tot Bk Loan Incr   .008     .003  -.000    -.000  -.000   -.000 
    (2.65)    (0.83)  (0.27)   (0.43)  (0.90) (1.26) 
  Main Bank Ln Frac   .362     .494  -.155    -.068  -.180   -.060 
    (1.70)    (2.39)  (0.97)   (0.45)  (0.96) (0.29) 
  Industry dummies 
    Construction    .028     .074   .214     .319  -.018   -.019 
    (0.20)    (0.53)  (20.5)   (2.36)  (0.12) (0.13) 
  Trade  -.257    -.216  -.132   -.080  -.025   -.071 
    (2.04)    (1.99)  (1.02)   (0.68)  (0.21) (0.61) 
    Serv & Fin  .222     .118   .036     .060  -.295   -.101 
    (1.28)    (0.54)  (0.21)   (0.35)  (0.91) (0.28) 
    Utilities   .185     .150  -.054    -.021   .040   -.003 
    (1.07)    (0.93)  (0.37)   (0.15)  (0.19) (0.02) 
  Light  Ind  -.101    -.072  -.021   -.001  -.165   -.139 
    (1.18)    (0.91)  (0.19)   (0.01)  (1.73) (1.47) 
  Chemicals  -.212    -.196    .074     .094  -.157   -.170 
    (1.95)    (1.98)  (0.50)   (0.72)  (1.35) (1.48) 
  Machinery  -.127    -.121  -.042   -.051  -.106   -.075 
    (1.39)    (1.43)  (0.43)   (0.54)  (1.09) (0.79) 
 
  R2    .04     .03   .02     .02   .03     .03 
  n     762     860   796     888   886     941 
 
 
B.  Prior period independent variables* 
 
  ROI       -.006     .002 
          (1.68)     (0.46) 
 Positive  Prof           .048     .116 
             (0.12)     (0.86) 
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Table 4:  Determinants of Net Increase in Bankers  




          80-85    .      86-90    .      90-94    . 
 
II.  Using Concurrent Banker Increase as Dependent Variable: 
 
A.  Same period independent variables* 
 
 ROI  .004     .002      .002 
    (2.06)      (1.19)    (1.08) 
  Positive  Prof     -.349      .110     -.143 
         (2.19)      (1.44)    (2.04) 
 
 
B.  Prior period independent variables* 
 
 ROI        -.002    .000 
          (1.52)    (0.07) 
  Positive  Prof           .289     -.074 
               (1.24)    (1.39) 
  
 
III.  Using Total Banker Increase as Dependent Variable: 
 
A.  Same period independent variables* 
 
  ROI  -.003    .001      .001 
    (0.82)      (0.39)    (0.12) 
  Positive  Prof     -.347      .186     -.034 
         (1.25)      (1.02)    (0.26) 
 
 
B.  Prior period independent variables* 
 
 ROI        .004      .002 
          (0.91)    (0.48) 
  Positive  Prof           .337     .042 






 Notes:  * Other variables used in Panel I.A. are used in these 
regressions as well, but the results are not reported. 
  In each case, we give the oefficients, followed by the absolute value 
of t-statistics (calculated using OLS with robust standard errors) in the 
parentheses below.   
  The regressions include a constant term, not reported here. 
 
 Sources:  See Table 1. 
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Table 5:  Determinants of Total Stock of  




      Independent var’s   Independent var’s  Independent var’s 
          from 80-85   .      from 86-90   .      from 90-94   . 
 
I.  Using Past Banker as Dependent Variable: 
    1980   1985  1985    1990  1990    1995    . 
 
A.  And Positive Prof as an independent variable: 
 
  Positive Prof  -.176    -.173  -.434   -.359  -.154   -.044 
      (0.44)   (0.38)  (1.78)  (1.51) (0.72) (0.21) 
 Board  Size  .032   .028  .030    .020  -.001    .008 
      (3.77)   (3.09)  (3.32)  (2.34) (0.05) (1.08) 
  Total Assets (106)-.434    -.408  -.292   -.265  .118    -.073 
      (4.20)   (3.73)  (3.78)  (3.88) (0.61) (1.06) 
  Leverage  1.606    1.994  1.650   1.554 2.030    1.533 
      (5.53)   (6.31)  (5.80)  (5.17) (5.02) (3.53) 
 Tang  At/TA  .332   -.143  -.446    -.172  -1.144  -1.163 
      (0.96)   (0.38)  (1.09)  (0.43) (1.80) (2.16) 
  Tot Bk Loan Incr  -.001    .004  -.000   -.001  .000    -.000 
      (0.28)   0.62)  (0.35)  (0.82) (0.95) (0.02) 
  Main Bank Ln Frac  -.433    .055  -.004   -.072  -.367   -.427 
      (1.69)   (0.18)  (0.02)  (0.29) (1.35) (1.56) 
  Industry dummies 
  Construction   .114   .192  .093    .226  .046    .027 
      (0.68)   (0.96)  (0.49)  (1.12) (0.20) (0.11) 
  Trade  .209   -.005  .035    .045  -.248    -.318 
      (1.21)   (0.03)  (0.21)  (0.28) (1.37) (1.78) 
  Serv  &  Fin  .272   .388  .222    .282  1.980    1.878 
      (1.00)   (1.72)  (1.03)  (1.17) (2.87) (3.02) 
  Utilities  .050   .196  .292    .271  .308    .305 
      (0.29)   (0.74)  (1.05)  (1.09) (1.19) (1.10) 
  Light  Ind  .322   .250  .209    .208  .213    .074 
      (2.30)   (1.76)  (1.51)  (1.40) (1.43) (0.46) 
  Chemicals  .484   .289  .322    .416  .437    .266 
      (3.25)   (2.02)  (2.27)  (2.37) (2.48) (1.57) 
  Machinery  .517   .402  .270    .219  .104    .029 
      (4.34)   (3.24)  (2.17)  (1.68) (0.75) (0.19) 
 
 R2    .09    .08  .08   .07  .12   .11 
 n    901    860  888   888  941   941 
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I.  Using Past Banker as Dependent Variable (cont'd): 
    1980   1985  1985    1990  1990    1995    . 
 
B.  And ROI as an independent variable:* 
 
  ROI  -.009    -.015  -.001   -.001 -.007    -.009 
      (2.23)   (3.21)  (0.15)  (0.29) (0.91) (1.18) 
 
 
II.  Using Concurrent Banker as Dependent Variable: 
 
A.  And Positive Prof as an independent variable:* 
 
 Positive  Prof  .228   -.121  .087    .198  .189    .045 
      (2.21)   (0.58)  (1.25)  (3.33) (4.38) (0.69) 
 
 
B.  And ROI as an independent variable:* 
 
  ROI  -.003   .001  .001   .003  .001   .003 














 Notes:  * Other variables used in Panel I.A. are used in these 
regressions as well, but the results are not reported. 
  In each case, we give the oefficients, followed by the absolute value 
of t-statistics (calculated using OLS with robust standard errors) in the 
parentheses below.   
  The regressions include a constant term, not reported here. 
  In the first column, we regress the stock of banker-directors at the 
firm in 1980, on the 1980-85 independent (financial) variables.  In the 
second column, we regress the stock of 1985 banker-directors on the same 
independent variables. 
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Table 6:  Shipbuilding Firms in the 1980s Recession 
 
 
 NKK  Sumitomo  Mitsui  Hitachi   
   Heavy  Ind  Shipb'g  Shipb'g  . 
Loss years  1987  1986, 1987  1986, 1987  1986, 1987 
 
87  board  size  40 18 23 20 
87 dir's from 86  32  15  20  6 
87 dirs to 88  27  13  19  13 
86 dirs to 88  23  13  16  4 
 
86-88 turnover   43 %  28 %  30 %  80 % 
 
86-88 net banker incr   0  +1  0  +3 
 
Survival  yes yes yes yes 
 
 
 Sasebo    Mitsubishi  Kawasaki  Ishikawajima 
  Heavy Ind  Heavy Ind  Heavy Ind  Harima HI  . 
Loss years  1987, 1988  None  1986, 1987  1987 
 
87  board  size  18 40 29 32 
87 dir's from 86  5  31  24  24 
87 dirs to 88  2  27  28  24 
86 dirs to 88  2  19  23  20 
 
86-88 turnover (%)  89 %  53 %  21 %  38 % 
 
86-88 net banker incr  +3  0  -1  -1 
 












     Notes:  Those fiscal years from 1986-88 for which the firms posted pre-tax 
losses, followed by the board size in 1987, the number of directors in 1987 who 
had also served on the board in 1986, the number of 1987 directors who continued 
to serve in 1988, the number of 1986 directors who continued to 1988, the 
percentage of the board that turned over from 1986 to 1988, and the net increase 
in the number of retired or concurrent bankers on the board from 1986 to 1988. 
 
     Sources:  Securities filings, for appropriate years and firms. Relationship Banking in Japan:  Page 40 
Table 7:  Reliance on Main Bank, 
by Outstanding Debt and Profitability 
 
 
A.  Main Bank Loan Fraction, 1980-1985 (Mean Values): 
       Profitability 
    Very  low   Low       High      Very  high 
Outstanding Debt 
 
Very low  .493 (12)  .412 (20)  .436 (46)  .492 (47) 
Low  .330 (46)  .274 (40)  .326 (46)  .361 (34) 
High  .271 (54)  .250 (60)  .267 (40)  .231 (21) 
Very high  .215 (74)  .193 (59)  .205 (48)  .292 (11) 
 
 
B.  Main Bank Loan Fraction, 1986-1990 (Mean Values): 
       Profitability 
    Very  low   Low       High      Very  high 
Outstanding Debt       
 
Very low  .588 (22)  .561 (42)  .503 (54)  .494 (58) 
Low  .331 (44)  .285 (49)  .338 (55)  .354 (37) 
High  .301 (63)  .267 (66)  .268 (48)  .276 (22) 
Very high  .252 (78)  .214 (63)  .181 (43)  .286 (23) 
 
 
C.  Main Bank Loan Fraction, 1990-1994 (Mean Values): 
       Profitability 
    Very  low   Low       High      Very  high 
Outstanding Debt       
 
Very low  .565 (24)  .449 (31)  .546 (52)  .515 (41) 
Low  .392 (43)  .351 (38)  .301 (46)  .328 (37) 
High  .294 (58)  .267 (53)  .288 (41)  .272 (23) 
Very high  .277 (67)  .235 (76)  .242 (39)  .271 (17) 
 
 
 Notes:  The data are partitioned into quartiles, by 
Profitability (by columns) and by Total Bank Loans (by rows).  In 
each case, we give the Main Bank Loan Fraction for that cell, 
followed by the number of firms in that cell, in parentheses.  
Quartiles are uneven because we exclde firms that changed their 
main bank affiliation during the period. 
 
 
 Sources:  See Table 1. Relationship Banking in Japan:  Page 41 
 
Table 8:  Main Bank Stability and Loans to Distressed Firms 
 
 
   1980-85   1986-90   1990-94 
 
A.  Main Bank Switch Rates (Mean Values): 
 1.    Bottom quartile firms, by profitability    
   .281    .229    .266 
 2.    Top three quartile firms, by profitability 
   .303    .201    .283 
 
B.  MB Loan Fraction Increase (Mean Values): 
 1.    Bottom quartile firms, by profitability 
   .021    .033    -.023 
 2.    Top three quartile firms, by profitability  
   .030    .034    -.012 
 
C.  Correlation Coefficients between MB Loan Frac Incr and Tot Bank Loan Incr: 
  1.  Firms with a Total Loan Increase: 
    a.  Bottom quartile firms, by profitability 
   -.323***   .040    -.375*** 
    b.  Top three quartile firms, by profitability  
   -.239***   -.283***   -.316*** 
 2.    Firms with a Total Loan Decrease:   
    a.  Bottom quartile firms, by profitability 
   -.443***   -.567***   -.179 
  b.    Top three quartile firms, by profitability  









 Note:  *** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 
percent level, and * at the 10 percent level. 
  Panel A gives the fraction of firms that switched their main bank 
affiliation during the period, for each period. 
  Panel B gives the applicable correlation coefficient for each period.   
  Panel C excludes firms that changed their main bank during a 
given period.   
  Panel D gives the correlation coefficient between (i) the increase in 
fraction of total outstanding bank debt that has been lent by the main bank and 
(ii) the increase in the total bank debt, for each periods.  Panel D excludes 
firms that changed their main bank during a given period.  
 
 Sources:  See Table 1. 
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Table 9:  Main Bank Loans to Firms with Three or More 




  n  1972  1978 1981  1983   1984 1987 1990  1996 
 
A.  Mean Amounts (in Million Yen) Borrowed from All sources: 
Mean of all firms 134  16182   32055  37876   41870  39775   40153  38972   48608 
 
Outstanding Debt 
  >100 bill. yen   15  88730  191977 250569  271031 255853  266234 229873  273926 
  10-100 bill.   40  14396   24914  24952   27497  26552   27088  25705   29946 
  5-10 bill.   25   3528    6592   6224    7189   7202   10841  19069   35020 
  <5 bill.   54   2096    3658   3021    2745   2562    3199   7008   10362 
 
B.  Mean Amounts (in Million Yen) Borrowed from Main Bank: 
Mean of all firms 134  3219   5823   6874   7056   6692   7351   8021   9955 
 
Outstanding Debt 
  >100 bill. yen   15  12539  29394  39084  38514  36063  41613  43458  56535 
  10-100 bill.   40   4440   5837   5906   5855   5561   6632   6092   6161 
  5-10 bill.   25   1049   1563   1543   2015   2147   2235   2755   4952 
  <5 bill.   54    508    967    891    979    943   1056   1523   2457 
 
C.  Mean Percentage Borrowed from Main Bank: 
Mean of all firms 134  19.9  18.2  18.1  16.9  16.8  18.3  20.6  20.5 
 
Outstanding Debt 
  >100 bill. yen   15  14.1  15.3  15.6  14.2  14.1  15.6  18.9  20.6 
    10-100  bill.   40  30.8 23.4  23.7 21.3  20.9 24.5  23.7 20.6 
  5-10 bill.   25  29.7  23.7  24.8  28.0  29.8  21.5  14.4  14.1 








 Notes:  The firms are the 134 non-financial exchange-
listed firms listed in Shukan toyo keizai, Aug. 11, 1984, 
as having 3 or more consecutive loss years (after interest, 
but before extraordinary gains and losses).  The "mean 
percentage borrowed" is the percentage of the total debt in 
each tier borrowed from the main bank.  Debt categories are 
based on amounts outstanding as of March 1984.   
 
 Sources:  See Table 1. Relationship Banking in Japan:  Page 43 
 




A.  By 1986-90 Growth Quartiles (All Firms): 
 
    1.  Growth       2.  Profitability 
  1980-85 1986-90 1990-94  1980-85 1986-90 1990-94 
Very Low  19.493   11.463  10.848  .058   .036    .033 
Low  25.203   39.043  17.017  .066   .052    .042 
High  30.096   63.656  18.827  .072.   .053    .042 
Very High  33.346  157.153  30.379  .084   .071    .052 
 
          3. Leverage          4. Total Bank Loan Incr 
   1980-85 1986-90  1990-94  1980-85  1986-90  1990-94 
Very Low    .763     .708    .673  .595  -.032    .372 
Low    .704     .642    .613  .585   .221   4.497 
High    .672     .625    .596  .215   .625    .961 
Very High    .689     .604    .554  .855  3.471  11.938 
 
      5. MB Loan Fraction         6. MB Change 
   1980-85  1986-9  1990-94  1980-85  1986-90  1990-94 
Very Low    .277     .290    .294  .246   .169    .220 
Low    .290     .306    .319  .292   .198    .233 
High    .296     .330    .327  .353   .264    .349 
Very High    .319     .381    .383  .292   .206    .330 
 
 
B.  By 1990-94 Profitability Quartiles (All Firms): 
 
    1.  Growth       2.  Profitability 
  1980-85 1986-90 1990-94  1980-85 1986-90 1990-94 
Very Low  27.956   54.474   3.481  .053   .025    .009 
Low  22.620   59.021  15.960  .060   .041    .033 
High  28.061   65.077  24.989  .070   .054    .048 
Very High  29.069   94.780  42.896  .101   .093    .086 
 
          3. Leverage          4. Total Bank Loan Incr 
  1980-85 1986-90 1990-94  1980-85 1986-90 1990-94 
Very Low    .739     .686    .675  .248  1.871  10.431 
Low    .735     .677    .647  .563  1.019    .914 
High    .705     .646    .615  .688   .195   2.766 
Very High    .639     .577    .509  .739   .158    .444 
 
      5. MB Loan Fraction         6. MB Change 
  1980-85 1986-90 1990-94  1980-85 1986-90 1990-94 
Very Low    .292     .322    .312  .278   .215    .266 
Low    .274     .301    .298  .303   .179    .252 
High    .285     .323    .337  .304   .224    .300 
Very High    .331     .366    .382  .282   .218    .302 
 
     Notes:  In Panel A, the data are partitioned by 1986-90 Growth and 
by the other variables given; in Panel B. they are partitioned by 1990-
94 Profitability and the other variables given. 
 
     Sources:  See table 1. Relationship Banking in Japan:  Page 44 
Table 11: 
Impact of 1986-90 Performance on 1990-94 Performance 
 
 
         (1)       (2)       (3) 
                      Dependent variable  
    Profitability  Profitability     Growth   . 
Growth (x10
4)   .507 (2.79)      .037 (1.38) 
Profitability   .587  (12.41)   
Total Assets (x10
7)   .012 (0.84)  -.009 (1.31)   -3.21 (0.16) 
Tangible Assets/TA   .026 (3.61)  -.007 (1.23)  18.951 (2.60) 
Total Bank Loan (x10
7)  -.096 (1.99)   .013 (0.74)    -133 (1.94) 
MBLoan Fraction   .007 (1.10)  -.001 (0.28)  -2.961 (0.62) 
MB Change  -.001 (0.38)   .001 (0.61)  -1.523 (0.78) 
Industry dummies: 
  Construction   .006 (1.37)   .012 (4.61)  26.541 (7.72) 
  Trade  -.009 (2.05)  -.005 (2.12)   2.835 (0.80) 
  Service & fin  -.006 (0.79)   .002 (0.39)   9.269 (1.46) 
  Utilities  -.006 (1.27)   .002 (0.64)   9.496 (2.30) 
  Light industry  -.009 (2.02)  -.003 (1.14)  -4.688 (1.54) 
  Chemicals  -.004 (0.83)  -.003 (1.02)  -2.676 (0.90) 
  Machinery  -.011 (2.53)  -.003 (1.06)  -2.387 (0.88) 
 
R2       .06      .53      .14 



















 Notes:  The dependent variables (Profitability and Growth) are from 
1990-94, while all independent variables are from 1986-90.  In each case, we 
give the coefficients, followed by the absolute value of t-statistics 
(calculated using OLS with robust standard errors) in the parentheses below.   
  The regressions include a constant term, not reported here. 
  
 Sources:  See Table 1. Relationship Banking in Japan:  Page 45 
 Appendix Table A-1:   




A.  By 1986-90 Growth Quartiles (Construction Firms Only): 
 
    1.  Growth       2.  Profitability 
  1980-85 1986-90 1990-94  1980-85 1986-90 1990-94 
Very Low  17.519   18.077  36.270  .032  .022  .042 
Low   9.454   38.715  38.270  .049  .044  .051 
High 18.544    65.183  40.761  .049  .040  .049 
Very High  19.096  148.913  40.790  .046  .052  .058 
 
          3. Leverage          4. Total Bank Loan Incr 
   1980-85 1986-90  1990-94  1980-85  1986-90  1990-94 
Very  Low  .823 .806 .794  .632 -.107  .430 
Low  .775 .753 .743  .205 -.079  .624 
High  .767 .760 .743  .504   .621  .887 
Very  High  .817 .771 .718  .772   .042  .731 
 
      5. MB Loan Fraction         6. MB Change 
   1980-85  1986-9  1990-94  1980-85  1986-90  1990-94 
Very  Low  .295 .280 .270  .307 .385 .154 
Low  .274 .271 .257  .333 .167 .125 
High  .273 .293 .282  .161 .129 .194 
Very  High  .277 .267 .280  .370 .148 .296 
 
 
B.  By 1990-94 Profitability Quartiles (Construction Firms Only): 
 
    1.  Growth       2.  Profitability 
  1980-85 1986-90 1990-94  1980-85 1986-90 1990-94 
Very Low  15.085   50.393  34.939  .032  .022  .021 
Low   9.474   59.167  37.746  .035  .026  .033 
High 18.961    74.882  36.371  .043  .038  .048 
Very High  19.867  113.666  47.851  .066  .071  .081 
 
          3. Leverage          4. Total Bank Loan Incr 
  1980-85 1986-90 1990-94  1980-85 1986-90 1990-94 
Very  Low  .805 .773 .776  .220   .210  1.238 
Low  .863 .857 .855  .207   .122    .952 
High  .795 .785 .762  .855   .459    .657 
Very  High  .708 .660 .602  .402 -.372    .568 
 
      5. MB Loan Fraction         6. MB Change 
  1980-85 1986-90 1990-94  1980-85 1986-90 1990-94 
Very  Low  .232 .231 .252  .444 .222 .111 
Low  .245 .248 .222  .258 .226 .194 
High  .305 .289 .300  .211 .105 .237 
Very  High  .282 .318 .297  .348 .174 .174 
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C.  By 1986-90 Growth Quartiles (Trade Firms Only): 
 
    1.  Growth       2.  Profitability 
  1980-85 1986-90 1990-94  1980-85 1986-90 1990-94 
Very Low  22.792   15.770  11.427  .045  .031  .027 
Low 22.224    40.742  14.463 .053  .043  .036 
High  33.191    63.437  19.640  .060 .044 .035  
Very  High  43.988  165.286  32.337  .089 .069 .052  
 
          3. Leverage          4. Total Bank Loan Incr 
   1980-85 1986-90  1990-94  1980-85  1986-90  1990-94 
Very  Low  .803 .749 .728  4.505  -.140    .801 
Low  .809 .725 .680    .232  -.098  14.098   
High  .728  .672  .641   .647   .247   1.168 
Very High  .722  .618  .566   .413  13.840   1.799 
 
      5. MB Loan Fraction         6. MB Change 
   1980-85  1986-9  1990-94  1980-85  1986-90  1990-94 
Very  Low  .264 .296 .261  .440 .200 .269 
Low  .233 .295 .353  .156 .219 .219 
High  .321 .367 .306  .258 .355 .452 
Very  High  .282 .364 .368  .188 .156 .406 
 
 
D.  By 1990-94 Profitability Quartiles (Trade Firms Only): 
 
    1.  Growth       2.  Profitability 
  1980-85 1986-90 1990-94  1980-85 1986-90 1990-94 
Very Low  22.294   75.943  -2.964  .035  .023  .012 
Low 34.018    59.405  20.739 .069  .044  .032 
High 36.860    65.632  29.561  .075  .058  .048 
Very High  42.088  147.825  64.924  .103  .101  .093 
 
          3. Leverage          4. Total Bank Loan Incr 
  1980-85 1986-90 1990-94  1980-85 1986-90 1990-94 
Very Low  .831  .796  .777   .377  7.281   1.732 
Low  .741 .648 .633  4.438  -.250      .907 
High  .742 .652 .599    .726  -.026  15.477 
Very High  .666  .581  .508   .081  -.541    .068 
 
      5. MB Loan Fraction         6. MB Change 
  1980-85 1986-90 1990-94  1980-85 1986-90 1990-94 
Very  Low  .269 .310 .293  .204 .224 .280 
Low  .321 .365 .307  .259 .111 .407  
High  .249 .297 .346  .281 .344 .406 
Very  High  .270 .412 .391  .294 .235 .294 
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E.  By 1986-90 Growth Quartiles (Machinery Firms Only): 
 
    1.  Growth       2.  Profitability 
  1980-85 1986-90 1990-94  1980-85 1986-90 1990-94 
Very Low  29.131   12.004   7.589  .062  .022  .025 
Low 38.627    39.202  13.191 .076  .045  .034 
High 38.779    63.150  11.026  .082  .052  .036 
Very High  41.436  143.262  22.931  .114  .084  .055 
 
          3. Leverage          4. Total Bank Loan Incr 
   1980-85 1986-90  1990-94  1980-85  1986-90  1990-94 
Very  Low  .691 .629 .613  .123 -.093      .771 
Low  .629 .574 .560  .237   .659      .985 
High  .592 .552 .546  .039 1.607    1.021 
Very  High  .582 .500 .447  .177 1.418  45.079 
 
      5. MB Loan Fraction         6. MB Change 
   1980-85  1986-9  1990-94  1980-85  1986-90  1990-94 
Very  Low  .302 .320 .314  .156 .130 .299 
Low  .341 .356 .342  .303 .167 .258 
High  .360 .357 .384  .281 .188 .344 
Very  High  .386 .435 .401  .196 .174 .435 
 
 
F.  By 1990-94 Profitability Quartiles (Machinery Firms Only): 
 
    1.  Growth       2.  Profitability 
  1980-85 1986-90 1990-94  1980-85 1986-90 1990-94 
Very Low  37.122   44.007   -.360  .068  .023  .006 
Low 34.221    57.245  10.334 .072  .040  .033 
High 35.944    52.465  20.090  .078  .052  .048 
Very High  36.788  101.067  32.778  .118  .094  .080 
 
          3. Leverage          4. Total Bank Loan Incr 
  1980-85 1986-90 1990-94  1980-85 1986-90 1990-94 
Very  Low  .644 .597 .598  .173 1.083  22.498 
Low  .648 .593 .576  .154   .886    1.720 
High  .616 .564 .561  .192   .521    1.443 
Very High  .567  .501  .420  .022   .115    .460 
 
      5. MB Loan Fraction         6. MB Change 
  1980-85 1986-90 1990-94  1980-85 1986-90 1990-94 
Very  Low  .341 .366 .340  .221 .168 .316 
Low  .313 .312 .312  .273 .178 .288 
High  .339 .382 .374  .280 .140 .320 





 Sources:  See Table 1. Relationship Banking in Japan:  Page 48 
 
 
Appendix Table A-2:  Determinants of Total Stock of  







      Independent var’s   Independent var’s  Independent var’s 
          from 80-85   .      from 86-90   .      from 90-94   . 
 
I.  Using Past Banker as Dependent Variable: 
    1980   1985  1985    1990  1990    1995    . 
 
A.  And Positive Prof as an independent variable: 
 
  Positive Prof  -.171    -.127  -.278   -.242  -.113   -.021 
      (0.51)   (0.37)  (1.73)  (1.45) (0.63) (0.12) 
  Board Size   .036     .032   .032    .022   .004    .009 
      (4.60)   (3.82)  (4.08)  (2.76) (0.66) (1.53) 
  Total Assets (x10
6)-.619    -.582  -.380   -.348   .020    .098 
      (4.22)   (3.65)  (3.63)  (3.47) (0.27) (1.70) 
  Leverage  1.762    2.181  1.676   1.538 1.786    1.295 
      (5.36)   (6.46)  (5.87)  (5.34) (5.38) (3.53) 
  Tang At/TA   .259    -.189  -.474   -.193  -.728   -.877 
      (0.72)   (0.49)  (1.19)  (0.50) (1.73) (2.14) 
  Tot Bk Loan Incr  -.003     .004  -.002   -.003   .000    .000 
      (0.26)   (0.47)  (0.57)  (0.98) (1.36) (0.07) 
  Main Bank Ln Frac  -.540     .025  -.081   -.144  -.409   -.451 
      (1.63)   (0.07)  (0.29)  (0.53) (1.51) (1.62) 
  Industry dummies 
    Construction    .104     .140  -.127    .158   .084    .008 
      (0.55)   (0.72)  (0.67)  (0.84) (0.43) (0.04) 
    Trade   .249     .016   .031   -.054  -.209   -.305 
      (1.32)   (0.08)  (0.17)  (0.29) (1.09) (1.63) 
    Serv & Fin   .297     .376   .208    .270  1.054   1.016 
      (1.01)   (1.75)  (0.96)  (1.17) (4.55) (4.15) 
    Utilities   .086     .215   .308    .286   .296    .250 
      (0.42)   (0.82)  (1.19)  (1.24) (1.32) (1.09) 
    Light Ind   .359     .267   .214    .211   .221    .069 
      (2.27)   (1.73)  (1.43)  (1.34) (1.41) (0.43) 
    Chemicals   .472     .287   .309    .382   .415    .240 
      (3.20)   (1.99)  (2.19)  (2.37) (2.57) (1.55) 
    Machinery   .552     .429   .277    .225   .138    .038 
      (4.07)   (3.18)  (2.03)  (1.56) (0.94) (0.25) 
 
 Pseudo  R
2   .05     .05   .04     .04   .08     .06 
  n     861     860   888     888   941     941 Relationship Banking in Japan:  Page 49 
 
Appendix Table A-2:  Determinants of Stock of Bankers  







I.  Using Past Banker as Dependent Variable (cont'd): 
    1980   1985  1985    1990  1990    1995    . 
 
B.  And ROI as an independent variable:* 
 
  ROI  -.009    -.016  -.000   -.001 -.007    -.008 
      (2.03)   (2.79)  (0.05)  (0.27) (1.09) (1.31) 
 
 
II.  Using Concurrent Banker as Dependent Variable: 
 
A.  And Positive Prof as an independent variable:* 
 
  Positive Prof  1.456    -.530   .453   1.356  1.727    .310 
      (1.40)   (0.86)  (0.95)  (2.27) (2.54) (0.75) 
 
 
B.  And ROI as an independent variable:* 
 
  ROI  -.011     .004   .007    .015   .002    .014 














 Notes:  * Other variables used in Panel I.A. are used in these 
regressions as well, but the results are not reported. 
  In each case, we give the coefficients, followed by the absolute value 
of z-statistics in the parentheses below.  The estimates are Poisson, 
calculated with robust standard errors. 
  The regressions include a constant term, not reported here. 
  In the first column, we regress the stock of banker-directors at the 
firm in 1980, on the 1980-85 independent (financial) variables.  In the 
second column, we regress the stock of 1985 banker-directors on the same 
independent variables. 
 
 Sources:  See Table 1. 